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capital accounts for more
than half this growth.
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transmissions  and
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each account for about 20
percent of the effect of
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Summary findings
Wacziarg investigates the links between trade policy and  quality of macroeconomic policy each account for about
economic growth using data from a panel of 57 countries  20 percent of the impact of trade openness on growth.
from 1970--89. This is the first attempt to empirically  This decomposition is robust to alternative
evaluate, in a cross-country context, the respective roles  specifications and time periods. Wacziarg also
of various theories of dynamic gains from trade in  successfully  tests whether the empirical methodology
explaining the observed positive impact of trade  captures all or most of the effects of trade policy on
openness on economic growth.  growth.
Wacziarg uses a new measure of trade openness, based  The lack of statistically significant results concerning
on the effective policy component  of trade shares, in a  several other channels may be due to measurement
simultaneous equations system aimed at identifying the  problems. The black market premium may be a weak
effect of trade policy on several determinants of growth.  proxy for the efficiency of the price system. Moreover,
The results suggest that a policy of trade openness has a  international technological transmissions are very hard to
strong positive impact on economic growth.  measure, so there may be a downward bias in the
The accelerated accumulation of physical capital  estimates based on the manufactured exports channel,
accounts for more than half this effect. Enhanced  and a corresponding  overstatement of other channels.
technological transmissions and improvements in the
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The positive  empirical  association  between  trade  openness and  economic growth is a topic
of little  disagreement  among  economists.1 Although  theories  promoting  inward-oriented
development  strategies  flourished  in  the  fifties  and  sixties,  the  unsustainable  and  often
destructive  effects of import-substitution  policies have, by  and large,  discredited  the  idea
that  the  costs of an open trade  regime may outweigh  its potential  benefits.  Even relatively
recent  theories of imperfect competition  applied to international  trade,  although  they  often
overturn  the  results  of more  conventional  approaches,  have  led  to  notoriously  cautious
policy  prescriptions  as far as protection  is concerned.
However, it is unclear  whether  economists  have a clear empirical  understanding  of the
sources  of these  gains from trade,  especially  in  a dynamic  framework.  Theory  points  to
a number  of possible costs  and  benefits  of trade  openness,  not mutually  exclusive in gen-
eral.  Some of these theories  stress  the role of technological spillovers and  the international
transmission  of knowledge as a  source  of growth  for  open economies2. More  traditional,
static  theories  involve  the  role of allocative  efficiency, which can  be achieved more  easily
with  an open trade  regime even when  factors  of production  are assumed  to be immobile.
Higher  levels of output  are attained  when  countries  specialize according  to  their  compar-
ative  advantage,  so growth rates  can be expected  to increase in the transition  that  follows
a  liberalization  episode.  The  increased  degree  of market  competition  resulting  from  a
wider  scale  of market  interactions  yields  further  gains in efficiency. 3 More  generally,  by
increasing  the  size of the  market,  trade  openness  allows economies  to better  capture  the
potential  benefits  of increasing  returns  to  scale.  Yet  another  set of theories  points  to  the
complementary  aspects  of virtuous  policies:  Trade  policy openness may  create  incentives
for governments  to  adopt  less distortionary  domestic  policies and  more disciplined  types
of macroeconomic  management.
There  has been  very little empirical  work trying  to determine  the relative  roles of these
different  factors  in explaining  the observed  positive  impact  of trade  openness  on growth.
One tends  to  interpret  the  finding  that  trade  openness  spurs  growth  according  to  one's
preferred  theory,  and  to  disregard  two important  possibilities:  several of these  forces may
be operating  simultaneously;  and  trade  openness  may  also  involve some dynamic  costs,
even if these  are  outweighed  by  the  benefits.  This  becomes  especially  important  in  the
context  of increasing  integration:  by  determining  the  source of the  costs  and  benefits  of
trade  liberalization,  policy makers  can  hope to  maximize  the latter  and  to  minimize  the
former.
This paper  employs a fully specified empirical  model to evaluate  the channels  whereby
trade  policy  may  affect  growth.  It  starts  with  the  specification  of equations  describing
the  incidence  of trade  policy on  several  growth  determining  variables.  These  equations
are  meant  to  capture  different  theoretical  arguments  used  to  characterize  the  potential
costs  and  benefits  of trade  policy openness.  The  next  step  involves including  the  various
channel  variables  in  a  growth  regression.  By  multiplying  the  effects of trade  policy  on
'See,  for  instance,  Sachs  and  Warner  (1995a),  Vamvakidis  (1996),  Edwards  (1992),  Frankel  (1996)
among  many  other  studies.
2See, for instance,  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991).
3For  instance,  in Wacziarg  (1997).
1the  channel  and  the  effect of the  channel  on growth,  one is able to  identify  the  effect of
trade  policy on growth  through  that  specific mechanism.  The results of this  paper  suggest
a  strong  positive  effect  of trade  policy  openness  on  economic  growth,  with  accelerated
accumulation  of physical  capital  accounting  for more  than  one half of this  total  effect.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  Section  2 analyzes  the  theoretical  basis  for  the
six channels,  discusses  measurement  issues and  provides  preliminary  evidence concerning
trade  policy  and  growth.  Section  3 describes  the  empirical  methodology,  based  on  a
random  effects, instrumental  variables,  efficient estimator.  Section  4 provides  parameter
estimates  for  the  various  equations  in  the  model.  Section  5 contains  a  summary  of the
channel effects and addresses  issues of robustness  and exhaustiveness.  Section 6 concludes.
2  Theory,  Measurement  and  Preliminary  Evidence
2.1  The  Six  Channels  in Economic  Theory
Six  linkages between  trade  policy  and  economic  growth  are  considered  in our  empirical
model.4 These are meant  to  capture  the  dominant  theories  concerning  dynamic  gains  (or
possibly  losses)  from trade.  The underlying  assumption  is that  these  six channels,  taken
together,  adequately  capture  most  or  all  of the  total  effect  of trade  policy  on  growth.
We can classify  them  according  to  three  broad  categories:  government  policy,  domestic
allocation  and  distribution,  and  technological  transmissions.
2.1.1  Government  Policy
The  first  possibility  is that  trade  openness  creates  incentives  for policy makers  to  pursue
virtuous  macroeconomic  policies,  either  because  they  face the  threat  of capital  flight  or
because  they  have bound  themselves  in international  agreements,  implicit or explicit,  that
provide  a  check on  policy.  The  requirement  to  maintain  a  competitive  environment  for
domestic firms engaged in foreign transactions  may also require the maintenance  of a stable
macroeconomic  context.  In  turn,  the  quality  of macroeconomic  policy  is likely to  have
favorable effects on growth  (Fischer  (1993)).  Indeed,  macroeconomic  stability  may reduce
the  level of price  uncertainty;  furthermore,  moderate  levels of public  deficit  and  public
debt  reduce  the  extent  of crowding  out  as well as the  likelihood  of future  tax  increases,
furthering  the  ability  of domestic  firms to compete  on global  markets.
Another  way to  capture  the  effects of trade  openness  on governmental  activity  is to
consider its effect on the  size of government.  If more open economies  are subject  to larger
exogenous supply  and demand  shocks, a larger  government  may be better  able to  provide
insurance  or consumption  smoothing  through  redistribution  or other  forms  of social  pro-
grams  (Rodrik  (1996)).  On the other  hand,  open economies  may  tend  to subscribe  more
widely to  laissez-faire arguments,  and  to  limit  the  extent  of taxation  in order  to preserve
the economy's  price competitiveness  and  attractiveness  to  foreign investors.  The effect of
trade  policy  openness  on government  size, measured  by  the  public  consumption  of goods
and  services,  is therefore  theoretically  ambiguous.  On  the  other  hand,  although  theory
points  to the existence of a positive growth-maximizing  size of government  resulting  from a
4Other,  possibly  omitted  channels  arc  discussed  in  Section  5.
2trade-off  between  the productive  function  of public activities  and the  distortionary  nature
of taxation  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1992)), the  negative  impact  of a larger government
on growth in a cross-section  of countries  seems to  be an established  empirical  fact  (Barro
(1991)).
2.1.2  Allocation  and  Distribution
Open  economies  are less likely to have tradable  goods prices that  differ substantially  from
those  prevailing  on  world  markets,  because  free trade  should  lead  to  an  equalization  of
the  prices  of traded  goods  across  countries.  Once  the  effect  of non-tradable  goods  on
deviations  from purchasing  power parity  has been eliminated,  one should expect  countries
with  open  trade  policies  to  have  lower  overall price  levels  (relative  to  some  benchmark
country  like  the  United  States)  than  closed  economies  (Dollar  (1992)).  Such  a  result
stems  from the  fact that  open  countries  tend  to  specialize according  to  their  comparative
advantage.  Hence, theory  points  to  a lower degree of price distortions  in open economies.
In  turn,  price  distortions  have  been  shown  to  adversely  affect  accumulation  and  growth
(Easterly  (1989) and  (1993)).  This is just  one aspect  of the allocation  effects of free trade,
having  to  do with  a more efficient price system  in open  economies.
Factor  accumulation  may  also be  of crucial  importance.  Much  of the  effect of trade
policy on growth may well work through  the domestic  rate  of physical  investment,  which is
a determinant  of economic growth in a nearly tautological  sense (Levine and Renelt  (1992),
Baldwin  and  Seghezza  (1996)).  The  investment  channel  may  capture  several  types  of
theories.  Firstly,  countries  that  are relatively  labor  abundant,  when they  adopt  open trade
policies,  are likely to  experience  an increase  in the  wage-rental  ratio,  because  tendencies
towards factor  price equalization  lead to upward  pressures  on the wage rate  and  downward
pressures  on  the  price  of  investment  goods.  Translated  into  a  dynamic  context,  this
should  lead to  a  greater  level of investment  relative  to  GDP.  The  growth  benefits  from
this  effects  should  fade  out  as  more  and  more  countries  become  open.  Although  this
type of theoretical  argument  can only apply to relatively  labor  abundant  economies, most
protectionist  countries  tend  to  be more  labor  abundant,  so that  the  benefits  of openness
in terms  of growth  may  be greatest  precisely for those countries  that  are still  closed. 5
Secondly, and  perhaps  more importantly,  investment  may respond  to openness through
a  size of the  market  effect.6 As first  stressed  by  Adam  Smith,  market  size imposes  a
constraint  on the division  of labor,  so that  more open  countries  are better  able to exploit
increasing  returns  to  scale.  Trade  liberalization  may  thus  provide  the  type  of 'big  push'
effect  on  capital  accumulation  which  Murphy,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1989)  argued  was
required  in order  for  less  developed  countries  to  move  from  a  low growth  equilibrium
51However,  the scope of this argument is somewhat limited.  Since currently  'open' economies tend to
be  relatively capital abundant,  we would be left with the task  of explaining why their  investment rates
tend  to be  higher than  in 'closed' countries, once other determinants  of investment are kept  constant.
Indeed, openness for capital abundant  countries is associated with a lower wage-rental ratio  under free
trade  compared to autarky,  hence presumably with lower investment rates under free trade.  Hence, this
type  of theory helps make a  normative case in favor of liberalization,  but  does not really explain the
currently observed positive impact of trade on investment.
6We  need to explain why lower restrictions on imports should lead to a larger market for exports: since
economies face an intertemporal  budget constraint, balanced trade must hold at least in the long-run. In
this case, removing restrictions to imports is equivalent to allowing a greater volume of exports.
3to  a  path  of sustained  industrialization.  Preliminary  empirical  evidence  showing  that
the  extent  of the  market  raises  growth  largely  through  an increase  in the  rate  of capital
accumulation  was  provided  by  Ades  and  Glaeser  (1994),  thus  lending  support  to  'Big
Push'  theories.  Using a related  argument,  Wacziarg  (1997) argues  that  the  extent  of the
market  is an  important  determinant  of the  degree of product  market  competition.  The
entry  of new firms on  export  markets,  after  an  episode  of liberalization,  may  well entail
large  fixed investments.  This  points  to  the  rate  of investment  as a potentially  important
channel  linking trade  policy openness  and  growth.
Thirdly,  trade  liberalization  may simply allow domestic  agents to import  capital  goods
that  were unavailable  previously  (or produced  locally but  at  higher costs),  thus  removing
structural  constraints  on  investment.  These  imports  of capital  goods,  which  make  up
sizable proportions  of the  imports  of many  recently  liberalized  developing  countries,  also
embody  more  recent  technologies,  a further  source  of growth.
2.1.3  Technological  Transmission
The last channels that  we consider stem from the recent literature  on endogenous growth:  if
knowledge spillovers are a driving force for sustained,  long-run  growth, and open economies
are more exposed  to a worldwide  stock of productivity  enhancing  knowledge, then  techno-
logical transmissions  can  be a channel  through  which  trade  openness  affects growth  and
convergence  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1997), Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991)).  There  are
two potential  ways by which openness  may increase the  exposure  of the  domestic  economy
to  technological  transmissions.
Firstly,  more frequent  and sustained  international  trade  interactions  may make it easier
for domestic  producers  to  imitate  foreign technologies  and  to  incorporate  this  knowledge
in  their  own productive  processes  (Edwards  (1992)).  This  increased  exposure  can stem
from direct  imports  of high technology  goods or from greater  interaction  with  the  sources
of innovation  (through  enhanced  international  communication  and mobility  brought  forth
by economic  integration).  This  should  translate  into  a higher  capacity  to  compete  with
more advanced economies on world markets.  Such a pattern  was certainly  part  of the East
Asian growth miracle,  characterized  by broad  transformations  in the product  composition
of output  and  exports  from agriculture  to  heavy industry  and  finally to  high  technology
goods,  via the  imitation  of technology  originating  in Europe  and  the  United  States.
Secondly, foreign  direct investment,  whether  or not  it is associated  with joint  ventures,
often  leads  to  the  direct  international  transmission  of advanced  types  of technology,  ei-
ther  through  capital  goods imports  which  are later  imitated,  or through  the  diffusion of
knowhow and  expertise.  However, it is unclear, a priori,  that  trade  openness is associated
with greater  levels of foreign direct  investment.  On the one hand,  FDI may act as a substi-
tute  for trade,  as foreign  investment  is used to set up plants  producing  goods that  cannot
be imported  due to trade  restrictions  ("tariff-hopping").  On the other  hand, investors  may
view trade  openness  as a signal that  a country  is committed  to stable  and  market  oriented
economic  policies;  in  addition,  trade  openness  allows  them  to  import  the  intermediate
goods that  are required  to initiate  the projects,  to expect  repatriation  of some profits  and
to export  the goods that  they  produce.  Falling transport  costs may allow a 'slicing up the
value added chain',  whereby  firms can "produce  a good in a number  of stages  in a number
4of locations,  adding  a  little  bit  of value  at  each  stage"  (Krugman  (1995)).  Hence,  one
can plausibly  argue  that  FDI  acts as a complement,  not a  substitute,  to trade  openness.
Indeed,  existing  evidence suggests that  open economics tend  to attract  more foreign direct
investment  than  closed economies  (Harrison  and Revenga  (1995)).
In turn,  FDI is likely to spur  growth.  In fact, since the share of FDI in GDP  is typically
small (on the order of 1% of GDP on average),  it is hard  to argue that  FDI spurs growth via
traditional  physical capital  formation.  It is likely that,  if there  is any significant  dynamic
effect of FDI,  it captures  the  incidence of a certain  type  of technological  transmissions.
This,  indeed,  is the  interpretation  that  we shall favor for the  FDI  channel.
2.2  Characteristics  of  the  Data
2.2.1  Construction  of the  Trade Policy  Openness  Index
Measuring  the nature  of trade  regimes constitutes  a major challenge for any study involving
the  analysis  of trade  policy.  Indeed,  measures  of protection  are not readily  available for a
vast  number  of countries  and  time  periods.  It is worth  spending  some time  assessing the
existing  measures  of trade  openness,  of which there  are three  broad  categories:
Outcome measures  describe  the volume of existing  trade,  or its components.  This type
of indicator  is most subject  to endogeneity  problems  with  respect  to growth  (Frankel and
Romer  (1995)), but measures  actual  exposure to trade  interactions  and  hence may account
quite  well for the  effective level of integration.  On the  other  hand,  it may  correlate  only
imperfectly  with  attitudes  or institutions  relating  to  openness.  The  tendency  to  confuse
outcome  measures  with  policy  attitudes  (which  are  presumed  to  partly  determine  the
outcome)  has  been  a feature  of past  research,  largely because  precise  measures  of actual
trade  policies are not widely  available.
Policy indicators,  such as tariff  rates,  non tariff  barriers,  tariff  revenues, etc.,  describe
the  institutional  features  of a  country's  attitude  towards  the  rest  of the  world,  as far
as  trade  and  factor  flows are  concerned.  As such,  they  are  likely to  be  an  important
determinant  of the outcome  measures.  However, endogeneity problems  in their relationship
with  growth  are not absent,  and  their  availability  tends  to be limited.  Furthermore,  they
may  not directly  reflect the  degree of effective protection  faced  by domestic  agents,  but
only the  legal framework  to which  they  are confronted.
Lastly, we can consider  measures  of effective protection  based  on deviations  from the
predicted  free trade  volume  of trade.  Factor  endowment  and  gravity  models  of trade
generate  predictions  about  a  country's  propensity  to  trade  internationally.  For instance,
country  size,  distance  from  major  trading  partners,  negative  terms  of trade  shocks  can
be thought  to  affect  trade  volumes  negatively.  Similarly,  relative  endowments  of skilled
labor,  unskilled  labor,  capital  and  land  (or  natural  resources)  may  have  an  impact  on
overall trade  volumes,  as well as,  perhaps  more obviously, their  composition.  Using this
type  of variables  only, one can attempt  to predict  a country's  potential  free trade  volume
of international  commercial  transactions.  Deviations  of the  observed  trade  volume  from
this  potential  volume  provide  a measure  of how restrictive  the  trade  regime really  is.
Given  these  three  alternatives,  which one  should we choose  ?  Because  most  theories
about  dynamic  gains  from trade  have  to  do  with  policy  measures,  in the  sense that  the
5relevant comparisons  generally involve contrasting  free trade  to restricted  trade  or autarky,
our  objective  must  be to construct  an index  of trade  policy that  adequately  captures  the
nature  of the  policy  regime  vis-a-vis  international  trade.7 The  use  of outcome  measures
seems  undesirable  on  these  grounds.  We are  left  with  a  choice  between  direct  policy
indicators  and  effective protection  measures.  In  fact,  this  paper  employs  a  (presumably
optimal)  combination  of both.
There  are  three  drawbacks  to  using  effective protection  measures.  First,  there  is no
guarantee  that  the predicted  level of trade  adequately  measures  the  volume of commercial
transactions  that  would prevail  under  complete  free trade,  because  determinants  of po-
tential  trade  may  have been  omitted.  Second,  some gravity  or endowment  determinants
of potential  trade  may  be  highly  correlated  with  policy  attitudes.  For  instance,  large
countries  tend  to have more restrictive  trade  policies,  and so do relatively  labor  abundant
countries.  If this  is the  case,  the  deviation  of observed from  potential  trade  may  exclude
some valid information  about  policy (all the variation  in policy due to size effects and labor
abundance  has been  removed).  Lastly,  as long as the observed  volume  of trade  contains  a
white  noise disturbance  term,  deviations  from predicted  volumes will also contain  a white
noise  disturbance  (whose share  of the  variance  in the  total  variance  of the  measure  has
increased  due  to the differencing),  and  any use of such a variable as a regressor will induce
downward  bias associated  with  measurement  error.  The most serious problem  is probably
the  second  one, because  gravity-type  variables  can  be shown empirically  to be  important
determinants  of policy itself  (we shall  return  to this  issue in Section  4).
The major  drawback  of direct  policy  attitude  measures  is that  they  may  not  capture
effective levels of protection.  The approach  in this  paper  constitutes  an  attempt  to avoid
this  problem  as well  as those  associated  with  effective protection  measures.  Outcome
measures  can be viewed as resulting  from a series of factors:  gravity  determinants,  factor
endowments  and  policy  variables.  Appendix  IV  examines  a regression  of trade  volumes
on  several openness-determining  variables.  The  objective  is to  largely  explain  the  extent
of observed  trade  interactions.  This  can then  be broken  down into  several  components:
the  policy  component  of observed  trade  shares  is obtained  as the  weighted  sum  of the
policy measures  included  in the regression,  where the weights are the estimated  coefficients
from the  trade  volume  regression.  This  measure  can then  be  used  as an  index  of trade
policy  openness,  which can be interpreted  as the  portion  of observed  trade  shares  that  is
due  to  the  effective impact  of trade  policy.  This  procedure  avoids  both  the  problem  of
measurement  error due to the construction  of the difference between observed and potential
trade  volumes,  and  the  problem  of collinearity  between  gravity/endowment  factors  and
policy factors.  It  also limits the  potential  effect of omitted  variables  in the  equation  that
determines  trade  volumes, insofar as these omitted  factors  can be assumed  to bear  a weak
correlation  with  the  policy determinants  that  are included  in the  regression.
Our main concern is to obtain  a measure  that  applies to a broad  range of countries  over
the  period  1970-1989, and  that  adequately  accounts  for several  aspects  of trade  policy:
tariff  barriers,  non-tariff  barriers  and  other  forms of attitudes  towards  international  trade
which capture  whether  the  trade  policy  regime is outward-oriented  or not.  These  consid-
7Appendix  IV  presents  empirical  evidenec  in favor of this  choice:  thc  growth  effects of trade  openness
are  due mostly  to  the trade  policy  regime,  rather  than  to the  gravity  component  of trade  shares.
6erations  inspired  the  choice of the policy indicators  chosen to construct  the index.8 First,
tariff  rates  were available  for the  period  1980-1993 only, and  for approximately  50 coun-
tries.  To capture  the effects of tariff  barriers,  we used the share of import duty  revenues in
total  imports  (from the IMF's  government  finance statistics),  available  for more countries
and  a  wider  time  span.  This  has  two advantages.  First,  it  better  captures  the  effective
degree  of tariff  restrictions.  Direct  overall  measures  of tariff  protection  obtained  from
UNCTAD  are unweighted  averages of goods-specific tariff  rates.  However, duty  revenues
are  by construction  weighted by the  composition  of imports.  Furthermore,  there  may  be
a  weak relationship  between  officially declared  tariff  rates  and  those  that  are  effectively
implemented.  Duty  revenues once again  avoid this  problem  by measuring  the  amount  of
tariff  revenue  actually  collected.  One potential  limitation  of the  use of tariff  revenues is
that  prohibitive  tariff  rates  will tend  to  reduce  revenues  through  a  "Laffer  curve"  effect
applied  to imports.  Hence,  the  use of revenues may  lead  to underestimate  the  true  level
of tariff  barriers.  However, we are considering  duty  revenues as a  share of total  imports,
which  may  greatly  limit  the  incidence  of this  problem  (high tariff  rates  work to  reduce
revenues by deterring  imports,  so the ratio  of the two should roughly reflect effective tariff
rates).  Table I contains  correlations  between  tariff  revenues and  tariff  rates,  for the  dates
and countries  available  for both  measures.  The correlations  are very high, suggesting  that
the  choice between  the  two measures  may  not be a crucial  issue.
Table  I.  Correlations  Between  Duty  Revenues  and  Unweighted  Tariff  Rates
[Import  Duties  Import  Duties  Import  Duties 1
1980-84  l  1985-89  l  1990-94
Tariff rate  1980-84  0.67  0.74  0.73
Tariff rate  1985-89  0.64  0.75  0.72
Tariff rate  1990-94  0.80  0.84  0.83
Number of countries: 50.
Non-tariff  barriers  constitute  the  second component  of our trade  policy index.  Insofar
as policy-makers  employ  a diverse set of tools to attain  certain  policy  objectives,  and  the
mix  varies across  countries,  NTBs  may  actually  capture  much  of the  effective  degree of
protection.  However, measures  of NTBs  are highly imperfect.  Available  data  concern the
coverage rate  of NTBs,  i.e.  the  percentage  of goods affected by quotas,  voluntary  export
restraints,  etc.,  but  not  the  extent  to which  these  constraints  are binding.  Furthermore,
time series data  for NTBs have yet  to be assembled.  We use an unweighted  coverage ratio
for the  pre-Uruguay  Round  time  period,  published  by UNCTAD.  Presumably,  the  extent
of NTBs has varied somewhat  across time  although,  as with tariffs,  it is likely to be highly
autocorrelated  within  countries.  We are  unable  to  account  for this  time-series  variation,
since we only have one observation  for the  23 years under  consideration.  Presumably,  this
type  of measurement  error  should  weaken the  relationship  of NTBs  with  trade  volumes,
and  correspondingly  reduce the  weight  of this  indicator  in the  overall index.
We try  to  capture  the  overall  attitude  of policy  makers  using  a third  component  for
the  index  of trade  policy.  Sachs  and  Warner  (1995a) have  compiled  a  list  of dates  of
trade  liberalization,  including  episodes  of temporary  liberalization,  for  a large  sample  of
8Appendix  III  describes  in more  detail  the procedure  used  to  construct  this  index  of trade  policy.
7countries.  These dates  were constructed  by examining  trade  policy data  and by conducting
a  systematic  analysis  of the  literature  concerning  the  trade  regimes  of specific countries
(the results  of this  search are reported,  for each country,  in the  appendix  to their  paper).
We constructed  dummy  variables for a country's  liberalization  status,  for each year.  These
were then  averaged  over  the  time  periods  under  study  (1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-
89). Liberalization  status  is highly correlated  with  other  components  of trade  policy, and
is meant  to  capture  the  prevailing  policy  attitude  towards  foreign  trade.  Insofar  as this
indicator  receives  some  weight  in  the  index,  it  captures  factors  other  than  just  tariffs
barriers  and  NTBs;  in particular,  it may  help  account  for the  effect of time  variations  in
NTBs which we cannot  explicitly  account  for, due to  data  unavailability.9
Correlating  the  trade  policy index with  its three  components  (Appendix  III,  Table  A-
III-II)  can give an idea of the relative  weights attached  to each of these.  All the components
bear  correlations  with  the  overall index that  are larger  than  0.4 in absolute  value but  the
duty revenue component  dominates with  a correlation  ranging  from 0.72 to 0.77, depending
on the  time  period  under  consideration.  The  non-tariff  barriers  component  received the
smallest  weight.
We can  obtain  preliminary  insights  into  the  relationship  between  growth  and  trade
policy  by  examining  summary  statistics  for  the  two variables.  Tables  II  and  III  display
first  and  second  moments  for per  capita  GDP  growth  and  the  policy  index  for five-year
averages,  over the  1970-89 period.
Table  II.  Summary  statistics  for  Growth  and  the  Trade  Policy  Index
|_____________  Mean  I  Std.  Dev.  [ Minimum  I  Maximum-]
Growth  70-74  3.990  2.520  -0.499  12.351
Growth  75-79  2.333  2.845  -6.688  10.433
Growth  80-84  0.380  2.740  -8.277  6.018
Growth  85-89  1.974  2.455  -3.063  8.770
Trade  Policy 70-74  -1.305  8.496  -17.840  10.438
Trade  Policy 75-79  -0.937  8.460  -18.716  10.781
Trade Policy 80-84  -0.712  8.663  -19.358  10.784
Trade  Policy 85-89  -0.326  9.425  -26.000  10.781
Number of Observations: 57
Table III  indicates  that  trade  policy tends  to be much more persistent  over time than
growth  rates.  The simple contemporaneous  correlations  between growth  and openness  are
positive but  their magnitudes  are somewhat  small, especially  for the 1975-79 period during
which the  oil shock  may have affected the  relationship  between  openness  and  growth  in a
negative way. Overall these  simple correlation  suggest  that  the relationship  between  trade
policy openness and  growth may be conditional  on other  growth determinants  rather  than
absolute.
9The  exclusion  of this  indicator  from  the  trade  policy  index  reduced  the  precision  of  the  estimates
prcsented  below,  but  did  not  changecthe  qualitative  nature  of the  results.
8Table  III.  Correlation  Matrix  for  Growth  and  the  Trade  Policy  Index
I  Growth  Growth  Growth  Growth  Trade  Trade  Trade
l  l______  _  70-74  75-79  80-84  85-89  70-74  75-79  80-84
Growth  75-79  0.283  1.000
Growth  80-84  0.249  0.397  1.000
Growth  85-89  0.264  0.361  0.391  1.000
Trade  Pol.  70-74  0.242  0.168  0.259  0.286  1.000
Trade  Pol.  75-79  0.241  0.168  0.270  0.284  0.991  1.000
Trade  Pol.  80-84  0.267  0.177  0.285  0.294  0.967  0.982  1.000
Trade  Pol.  85-89  0.325  0.101  0.118  0.223  0.908  0.919  0.930
Number of Observations: 57
2.2.2  Measurement  of the  Channel  Variables
Some of the  channel  variables  considered in  Section  2.1 can be readily  measured.  Such is
the case for foreign direct  investment  inflows as a share of GDP, government  consumption
of goods and  services  as a share  of GDP  and  the  domestic  investment  rate.  So three  of
our six channels  can be captured  in fairly  uncontroversial  ways as far  as measurement  is
concerned.
The  other  three  channels  are  captured  by  composite  indices  or approximated  using
available  data.10 The  quality  of macroeconomic policy  is captured  by an index  that  gives
equal  weight  to  each of three  decile rankings  of policy  characteristics  for  each  country.
Specifically, for each  time  period,  each country  is ranked  on  a scale  of 1 to  10 according
to  its  decile  position  for  the  level of the  public  debt  as  a percentage  of GDP,  the  level
of the  government  deficit  as  a  share  of  GDP,  and  the  growth  of M2  net  of total  real
output  growth  (higher  numbers  signial better  policies).  The  rankings  are  then  averaged
to  obtain  an  index  of overall  macroeconomic  policy  quality,  which  reflects  a  country's
position  relative  to  others.  This  avoids  the  problem  of having  to  characterize  a  'good'
macroeconomic  policy  in absolute  terms.
The extent  of technological transmissions  is approximated  by the share of manufactured
exports  in  total  merchandise  exports,  admittedly  an  imperfect  proxy  for  technological
transmissions."1 The  main  rationale  for this  measure  is that  countries  able to  compete
effcctively on  world markets  for manufactured  goods  and  to  produce  at  world  standards
are  likely  to  incorporate  more  of the  existing  modern  technologies  in  their  productive
processes.  Other  suggestions  for the  measurement  of technological  transmissions  include
the  share  of manufactured  imports  in  merchandise  imports,  but  this  measure  suffers  a
major  drawback:  imports  of manufactures  may  act  as a substitute  rather  than  a proxy for
technological transmissions.12 On the other  hand,  if a country  is able to produce  at  world
° 0 Appendix III describes the  construction of these indices and proxies in more detail.
"The  share of manufactures in merchandise exports was used as a proxy for technological transmissions
in the World Bank's Global Economic Prospects, 1996.
'2XVe  tried  to  employ the  share of manufactured  imports  to total  merchandise imports  as  a  proxy
for technologica.l  transmissions, instead of the share  of manufactured  exports.  We could determine no
statistically significant relationship between this  variable and  growth on the one hand,  and  with trade
policy openness on the other, even when controlling for a diverse set of variables.
9standards,  the  likelihood  of it  absorbing  relatively  modern  technologies  is higher.  The
crucial  point  is  that  technological  advances  and  knowledge  embodied  in  existing  goods
must  make  their  way into production  processes  in order  to truly  qualify as technological
transmissions.  More direct  measures  of technological  absorption,  such as patent  licensing
agreements,  are extremely  difficult to  assemble for a wide array  of countries.
Lastly, we need  a measure  of price  distortions  prevailing  within  the economy, in order
to  capture  the  effect  of trade  policy  on  the  efficiency  of the  price  system.  Appendix
III-3  describes  a  direct  way  to  measure  price  distortions  originating  from  trade  policy
or  domestic  sources  such  as  taxation,  subsidies  and  imperfectly  competitive  pricing.13
However,  our  analysis  employs  a  less direct  approach.  The  black  market  premium  on
the  official exchange  rate  is widely  used  in  cross-country  analyses,  to  approximate  the
implementation  of distortionary  policies.  As argued  in Barro  (1995), "the  black  market
premium  on foreign  exchange  is a widely  available  and  apparently  accurate  measure  of
a  particular  price  distortion.  The  premium  likely  serves  as  a  proxy  for  governmental
distortions  of markets  more  generally".
It is useful to examine simple statistics  for the channels variables,  openness  and growth
averaged over the period  under  consideration  (Tables  IV and  V). This  might provide  some
preliminary  evidence  about  the  relevance  of our  choice of channels.  Table  IV  provides
information  about  the  means  and  standard  deviations  of the  main  variables,  which  may
prove useful when  interpreting  the  regression results.
Table  IV.  Summary  Statistics  for  the  main  variables.
|________________  |Mean  Std.  Dev.  I  Minimum  [  Maximum|
Growth  2.169  1.858  -1.798  7.513
Trade  Policy Openness  -0.820  8.588  -19.511  10.696
Macro  Policy Quality  5.203  1.711  1.750  8.833
Black Market  Premium  42.417  83.247  -0.471  437.182
Government  Consumption  15.591  6.681  7.731  33.962
Manufactured  Exports  36.933  25.138  0.421  83.664
Investment  Share  19.381  7.745  1.320  36.135
Foreign Direct  Investment  0.871  1.217  -0.761  7.876
Human  Capital  1.515  1.163  0.084  5.343
Log Income  Per  Capita  8.159  0.993  6.154  9.586
Number of Observations: 57
Table V displays correlations  between the main variables.  The most interesting  columns
to  examine  for our  purposes  are the  first  and  second.  The first  column  shows the  uncon-
ditional  relationship  between  channel  variables  and growth,  while the  second one contains
the  correlations  of trade  policy  with  the  channels.  Multiplying  the  numbers  in each col-
umn  gives a  rough  idea  of what  to  expect  in terms  of channels.  In  particular,  simple
correlations  suggest  that  all of the  channels  involve a positive  effect of trade  on economic
growth.  The  largest  correlations  appear  to  be in  the  investment  and  manufactured  ex-
ports  channels.  Overall,  these  correlations  show that  the  trade  policy  index is positively
1
3 Appendix  III-3  also explains  why  this  index  was not  used  in the  analysis.
10related  to FDI  as a share of GDP, macroeconomic  policy quality, manufactured  exports  as
a share  of merchandise  exports  and  the domestic  investment  ratio.  In turn,  each of these
are positively  related  to growth.  Trade  policy openness  is negatively  related  to  the  black
market  premium  and  government  size.  In turn,  each of these  is negatively  associated  with
growth.
Table  V.  Correlation  matrix  for  the  main  variables
1  Growth 1  Trade  Macro  BMP  I Govt.  Manuf  Inves.  FDI  Hum. 1
l__________  l_____  |Policy  Policy  |_  |_Cons.  Exp.  Share  |_  |_Cap.
Trade  Pol.  0.331  1.000  l
Macro Pol.  0.384  0.420  1.000
BMP  -0.408  -0.404  -0.304  1.000
Govt.  Cons.  -0.421  -0.265  -0.594  0.390  1.000
Manuf.  Exp.  0.387  0.602  0.393  -0.484  -0.268  1.000
Invest.  Sh.  0.483  0.674  0.441  -0.498  -0.428  0.556  1.000
FDI  0.503  0.263  0.155  -0.255  -0.296  -0.012  0.342  1.000
Human  Cap.  0.185  0.554  0.361  -0.357  -0.334  0.487  0.522  0.116  1.000
Log Income  0.266  0.743  0.469  -0.530  -0.504  0.648  0.754  0.188  0.750
Number of Observations: 57
3  Estimation  Framework
This  section  briefly reviews the  technical  aspects  of the  estimation  method  employed in
this  paper.  The  method  was  first  developed  and  employed  in  a  cross-country  growth
context  by  Tavares  and  Wacziarg  (1998), to  analyze  the  effects of democracy  on  growth.
The underlying  econometric  theory  is an extension  of Zellner and  Theil  (1962) to the case
of panel  data.
3.1  The  Structural  Model
The  basic framework  for the  cross-sectional  analysis  consists  of a simultaneous  equations
model  aimed  at  identifying  the  various  effects of trade  policy on growth.  The model  con-
sists of a growth  equation,  an equation  determining  the nature  of trade  policy, and a series
of channel  equations  describing  the  effects of trade  policy  on several growth  determining
variables.  This series of equations  constitutes  the structural  model, derived  from economic
theory:  the  channel  variables  are included  in the  growth regression,  but  the  measure  of
trade  policy  openness  only  appears  in  the  channel  relationships.  The  hope  is that  the
specification  of the  channels  fully exhausts  the  potential  ways in  which  openness  affects
growth  (some  formal evidence  concerning  this  issue  will be provided  in  Section  5).  The
equation  describing  the  determinants  of trade  policy openness  only  appears  in  order  to
make  explicit  endogeneity  issues,  having  to  do  with  the  simultaneous  determination  of
trade  policy,  growth  and  the  channel  variables.  In particular,  several  channel  variables
may  appear  on  the  right-hand  side  of the  trade  policy  equation.  But  this  relationship
could be removed  altogether  with  no implication  on the estimation  of the  channel  effects.
113.2  Estimation
The  parameters  of  the  structural  model  are  estimated  jointly  using  three-stage  least
squares.  This  method  achieves  consistency  by  appropriate  instrumenting,  and  efficiency
through  optimal  weighting.  It  combines features  of instrumental  variables,  random  effects
and  generalized  least squares  models.
Each  equation  in the  structural  model  is formulated  for the  four  time  periods  under
scrutiny  (1970-74, 1975-79,  1980-84, 1985-89).14  Joint  estimation  allows the  derivation
of a  large  covariance  matrix  for the  error  terms  of all 32 equations.  Hence,  both  cross-
period  and  cross-equation  error  correlations  are  brought  into  the  picture.  This  ensures
the  efficiency of the  estimates.  The  fact  that  cross-period  error  correlations  are  taken
into account  is akin  to assuming  that  the  error  terms  contain  country-specific  effects that
are uncorrelated  with  the right-hand  side variables.  The flexibility of the  error  covariance
matrix  means that  we are able to obtain  substantial  efficiency gains compared  to estimating
each equation  separately.
Since  several  endogenous  variables  appear  on  the  right-hand  side  of the  structural
equations,  endogeneity  bias must  be a major  concern.  To achieve consistency, we need to
instrument  for every endogenous  variable  appearing  as a regressor.  This  is done by  first
writing  the  model's  reduced  form,  in which  every  endogenous  variable  is rewritten  as a
function  of all the  exogenous variables in the  system.  The fitted  values of each endogenous
variables  from OLS estimation  of the  reduced  form will provide  suitable  instruments  for
each  corresponding  endogenous  variables  in  the  structural  form.15 Constructing  these
fitted  values constitutes  the  first  stage  of the  3SLS procedure.  The second  stage  consists
of estimating  each equation  in the structural  model  separately  via instrumental  variables
(or  two-stage  least  squares),  using  the  instruments  constructed  in  the  first  stage.  This
allows the  derivation  of a consistent  covariance  matrix  for the  error  terms  of the  model.
Lastly, the  third  stage  involves employing this  covariance  matrix  as a weighting  matrix  as
well as the  instruments  .derived in the  first  stage,  to jointly  estimate  the  equations  in the
structural  model  using  instrumental  variables-generalized  least  squares.  Instrumenting
ensures  consistency, while joint  estimation  ensures  asymptotic  efficiency.
3.3  Identification  and  Restrictions
As far as specification  is concerned,  some assumptions  are required  for this  methodology
to  carry through.  Enough  instruments  must  be validly excludable  from each equation  for
the  order  condition  to  be  met.  For each equation,  the  order  condition  for identification
states  that  at  least  as many  exogenous  variables  must  be  excluded  as regressors  as there
are  endogenous  variables  included  on  the  right-hand  side:  enough  exogenous  variables
"'In  addition,  we present  results  including  the  1990-92 period,  although  this  leads  to  a loss in degrees
of freedom.  For this  resaon,  the  baseline  model  only  extends  until  1989.
1'5Given the  above  specification  of the  baseline  model,  the  instruments  are:  male  and  female  human
capital,  the  island  dummy,  the  log of  population,  the  democracy  index,  the  log  of area,  terms  of trade
shocks,  population  density,  the  secondary  school  completion  rate,  the  share  of  population  over 65,  the
share  of population  under  15, ethnolinguistic  fractionalization,  postwar  independence  status,  each  taken
at  every  time  period  when  applicable.  Reflecting  concerns  for  the endogeneity  of per  capita  income  levels,
this  variable  was excluded  from the  instrument  list  (see  Caselli et  al.,  (1996)).
12must be validly  left out of each equation  for the  system  as a whole to be identified.' 6
The  chosen specification  is based  on  existing  empirical  work  on the  determinants  of
the  various  endogenous  variables  under  study.  For instance,  the  growth  and  investment
equations  are based  on common  specifications  used in the cross-country  growth  literature
(Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995)).  Similarly, the specification  of the  government  size equa-
tion is based  on Rodrik  (1996) and Alesina  and Wacziarg  (1997). For other  channels,  such
as the  macroeconomic  policy quality  channel,  we relied on  theoretical  priors  to  determine
the  set  of exclusions.17 The  specification  of each  equation  is given in  Section  4, which
contains  the  results  for the  parameter  estimates  of each equation  in the  system.
In order to assess the long-run  effects of trade  policy on growth in a unified manner,  we
impose  cross-period  parameter  equality  restrictions:  none of the estimates  of the  parame-
ters  in the structural  model are allowed to vary across time.  This allows efficiency gains via
higher degrees of freedom, as the number  of estimated  parameters  in the  system  is divided
by  four.  To examine  whether  these  restrictions  are justified,  there  are  two alternatives.
The first  one is to run the  system without  the  restrictions  and to test  the hypothesis  that
the  parameters  are  jointly  equal  between  the  two models.  However, the  loss in degrees
of freedom  is such,  that  it is unclear  whether  the  difference in  parameters  is due  to  the
imprecision  of the  estimates  in  the  unrestricted  model,  or to the  time  varying  nature  of
the  processes being modeled.  The second, preferred  alternative  is to  examine whether  the
results  are sensitive  to the  inclusion of any  given period.  This  is done  is Section  5.
4  Parameter  Estimates
This  section  presents,  for each equation  in the  system,  the  results  of the  estimation  pro-
cedure  applied  to five variants  of the  same  model.  Model I is the  baseline  model  for this
paper,  for  the  period  1970-89.  Model  II  includes  the  1990-92 period  into  the  analysis,
with  a corresponding  loss of 8 observations.  Model  III  restricts  the  sample  to developing
countries.  Model IV examines  the  robustness  of the  model to  the estimation  method,  by
employing the  Seemingly Unrelated  Regression  estimator.  This  estimator,  while inconsis-
tent  (no instruments  are used), is characterized  by greater  efficiency and may provide some
indication  of the  model's  robustness.  Lastly,  in model V, regional  dummy  variables  were
added to every equation  in the system, to account  for time invariant  region specific effects.
We should  expect  this  inclusion to  reduce  the  overall effect of trade  policy  on growth,  as
much of the  between-country  variation  in the  endogenous  variables  is now accounted  for
by the  regional  dummies.
4.1  Growth  equation
The  results  for the  growth  equation closely match  existing  findings  in the  cross-country
empirical  growth  literature  (see,  for  example,  Barro  (1991)).  The  rate  of  conditional
convergence in our sample  (equal to  the estimated  coefficient of the log of initial  income),
1.67%, is in line with  common  analyses  of convergence  in a cross-sectional  framework.
16We do not  check the rank  condition  for identification,  which can be safely assumed  to hold for a system
of this  size.
' 7Tavares  and  Wacziarg  (1998) discuss  in more  detail  the  issue  of specification  search  for  the  type  of
system  that  wc are considering.
13Table  VI:  Growth  Equation
Dep.  Var:  | Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  |  SUR  Regional
Growth  1970-89  [Countries  _  Dummies
Intercept  10.598  7.815  5.543  9.006  7.113
(4.70)  (6.74)  (3.55)  (4.59)  (2.99)
Log Initial  -1.672  -1.132  -1.106  -1.390  -0.740
Income  (-5.81)  (-7.66)  (-5.45)  (-5.17)  (-2.24)
BMP  -0.007  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005  -0.007
(-9.08)  (-21.81)  (-13.09)  (-8.85)  (-9.14)
Government  -0.042  -0.055  -0.025  -0.043  -0.043
Consumption  (-1.57)  (-5.76)  (-1.84)  (-2.20)  (-2.13)
Manufactured  0.004  0.002  0.006  0.007  -0.004
Exports  (0.45)  (0.53)  (1.01)  (1.14)  (-0.72)
Investment  0.143  0.132  0.146  0.143  0.109
Rate  (6.86)  (12.10)  (7.27)  (7.99)  (5.06)
FDI  0.320  0.249  0.271  0.355  0.178
(4.68)  (8.44)  (4.79)  (4.83)  (2.75)
Macro Policy  0.489  0.290  0.505  0.333  0.280
Quality  (4.22)  (8.62)  (8.70)  (5.03)  (3.27)
Male Human  0.481  0.732  1.351  0.448  -0.136
Capital  (1.59)  (4.24)  (5.47)  (1.57)  (-0.42)
Female  Human  -0.387  -0.862  -1.284  -0.429  0.005
Capital  (-1.39)  (-5.65)  (-5.30)  (-1.58)  (0.02)
Latin  America  - -2.291
Dummy  (-6.32)
South East  _  - - 0.047
Asia Dummy  (0.06)
Sub-Saharan  - -2.126
Africa Dummy  (-4.39)
OECD  - - -1.466
Dummy  (-3.15)
R-squared  .25 .29  .24 .26 .46  .34 .41  .27 .28  .23 .41
.41 .31  .39 .18  .54 .37  .45 .32  .52 .30
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent  (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
Most  of the  other  estimates  reflect  the  current  "Washington  consensus"  on  the  de-
terminants  of growth:  Table  VI  contains  evidence  pointing  to  the  positive  effects  of the
domestic  investment  rate,  male human  capital,  macroeconomic  policy quality  and  FDI  on
growth.  Negative  factors  include the  black  market  premium,  female human  capital  and
government  consumption  of goods and  services, while manufactured  exports  seem largely
unrelated  to economic  growth  in most  specifications.  The  pattern  of human  capital  coef-
ficients is in line with  results  by Barro  (1991), and  can  be interpreted  as resulting  from
conditional  convergence. 1 8
18A larger gap between male and female  human capital signals  a lower level of per capita income.
Conditional  on steady-state  determining  variables,  this gap should be negatively  associated  with growth.
14These results  do not seem sensitive  to changes in the  spccification.  Both  the signs and
orders of magnitude  of the  coefficients are preserved  in most cases.  In particular,  the signs
and  magnitudes  of all of the  channel variables  are maintained.
4.2  Openness  equation
The equation  accounting  for the degree of trade policy openness  (Table VII)  is considered
solely to  capture  various  endogeneity  issues.  Its  inclusion  in the  model  should  not  affect
the  estimates  in  the  other  equations,  except  insofar  as  efficiency  gains  are  concerned.
The  growth rate  of per  capita  GDP  is included  to control  for endogeneity  in the  growth-
openness  relationship.  A  one  percentage  point  increase  in  growth  is shown  to  trigger  a
.32  percentage  point  increase  in the  policy  component  of the  trade  ratio.  While  highly
significant  statistically,  this  effect is very small  economically.
Table VII.  Openness  Equation
Dep.  Var:  Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  [  Regional
Trade  Policy  1970-89  [ Countries  |  |Dummies
Intercept  -53.851  -49.902  -23.667  -53.115  -46.642
(-16.55)  (-21.34)  (-6.56)  (-17.66)  (-9.77)
Log Initial  6.548  6.559  3.468  6.422  5.528
Income  (17.55)  (30.36)  (10.07)  (18.57)  (12.96)
Island  Dummy  -3.049  -3.483  -2.124  -3.177  -3.848
(-2.37)  (-5.08)  (-1.83)  (-2.58)  (-2.96)
Log Area  -0.888  -0.653  -0.005  -0.866  -0.718
(-2.20)  (-3.73)  (-0.02)  (-2.35)  (-2.35)
Terms of Trade  -7.148  -13.690  -1.480  -6.877  -5.014
Shocks  (-4.97)  (-23.73)  (-1.56)  (-4.63)  (-4.01)
Growth  0.321  0.228  0.385  0.377  0.230
(10.44)  (20.31)  (30.24)  (12.03)  (8.13)
Log Population  0.420  -0.044  -0.973  0.432  -0.177
(0.79)  (-0.19)  (-2.19)  (0.90)  (-0.40)
Latin  America  - - - - 3.570
Dummy  (2.41)
South  East  Asia  - - - - 12.173
Dummy  (6.99)
Sub-Saharan  - - - - 6.597
Africa Dummy  (4.16)
OECD  - - - - 8.950
Dummy  (5.65)
R-squared  .55 .53  .54 .52.58  .26 .28  .55 .53  .67 .66
.60 .54  .53.45  .37 .32  .60 .54  .74 .72
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent  (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
If, in addition to this, the average  lcvel  of human capital (male and female)  has a positive  effect  on the
steady-state  income  level,  we obtain  the observed  pattern of male and female  human  capital coefficients.
15Measuring  country  size using  the  log of area,  we find that  larger  countries  have more
restrictive  trade  policies, reflecting several possible theoretical  explanations.  Firstly,  under
any model with  increasing  returns,  larger  countries should  experience  smaller  losses from
protection  than  smaller  ones,  prompting  them  to  a greater  vulnerability  to  protectionist
arguments.  Secondly, in the neoclassical  trade  theory,  the optimal  trade  policy for a large
country  is not  complete  free trade.  Because  they  can  affect  their  terms  of trade,  large
countries  should  implement  an  optimal  tariff  in  order  to  reach  allocative  efficiency, and
this  incentive  may  be  partly  reflected  in the  estimated  effect of land  area  (note  however
that  the  coefficient  country  size measured  by  the  log of population  is  not  significantly
different  from zero).1 9 At  any  rate,  the significance of the  area variable  and  of the  island
dummy  indicate  that  'gravity'  variables  do bear  some relationship  with  trade  policy, and
provide  further  justification  for the  method  used to  construct  the  trade  policy  openness
index.
4.3  Government  Policy
4.3.1  Macroeconomic  Policy  Quality
The policy quality equation  brings out the positive effects of democracy and trade  openness
on  the  quality of macroeconomic  management  (Table VIII).  In the  baseline  model,  a  10
percentage  point  difference  in trade  policy  openness,  which  corresponds  to  one standard
deviation  of the  index,  is associated  with  a  0.27 increase  in the  index of macroeconomic
policy quality,  which  ranges  from  1 to  10.  This  estimate  remains  statistically  significant
in four  of the  five models,  and  increases  in magnitude  when  the  sample  is restricted  to
developing  countries.
The effect of initial  per  capita  income on  the  quality  of macroeconomic  policy is gen-
erally  positive,  but not significant  at  the  5% level in the baseline  model.  Countries  with  a
larger share of government consumption  and  a high black market  premium  also have worse
macroeconomic  policies,  indicating  that  bad  policies tend  to  go  together.  The  negative
coefficient on the terms  of trade  shocks may reflect the fiscal response  to economic shocks.
t'Sce  also the discussion  in Alesina  and  Wacziarg  (1997) and  Alesina,  Spolaore  and  Wacziarg  (1997) for
more on thc relationship between country sizc and trade openness.
16Table  VIII:  Macroeconomic  policy  quality  channel
Dep.  Var:  Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  Regional
Macro  Policy  1970-89  1 Countries  Dummies
Intercept  5.980  5.695  11.534  6.647  4.371
(5.14)  (6.49)  (8.49)  (5.14)  (2.81)
Log Initial  0.187  0.203  -0.501  0.093  0.393
Income  (1.42)  (2.13)  (2.99)  (0.65)  (2.00)
Trade  Policy  0.027  0.038  0.033  0.048  0.014
Openness  (2.19)  (5.57)  (3.81)  (4.07)  (1.28)
BMP  -0.002  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  0.0002
(-1.90)  (-7.92)  (-3.42)  (-1.16)  (-0.20)
Government  -0.126  -0.126  -0.124  -0.122  -0.130
Consumption  (-8.25)  (-11.67)  (-12.09)  (-10.44)  (-8.57)
Ethnolinguistic  -0.006  0.001  -0.014  -0.005  -0.005
Fractionalization  (-1.45)  (-0.16)  (-5.37)  (-1.21)  (-0.96)
Terms  of Trade  -1.318  0.213  -1.091  -1.475  -1.252
Shocks  (-1.86)  (-0.54)  (-2.03)  (-2.35)  (-1.95)
Latin  America  - - - - -0.310
Dummy  (-0.87)
South  East  Asia  - - - - 0.631
Dummy  (-1.51)
Sub-Saharan  - - - - -0.176
Africa Dummy  (-0.45)
OECD  - - - - -0.147
Dummy  (-0.32)
R-squared  .36 .28  .35 .36 .45  .34 .37  .37 .28  .34 .29
.34 .36  .42 .35  .42 .34  .35 .36  .38 .37
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent  (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
4.3.2  Government  Size  Equation
Trade  policy has a positive impact  on government  size (Table IX) in the baseline regression.
This  provides  some support  to  results  by Rodrik  (1996), who  also reported  a significantly
positive  impact  of trade  shares  on government  size,  although  the  result  disappears  when
the  sample  is restricted  to developing  countries.2 0 Taken together  with  the  results  of the
growth  regression,  this  suggests that  government  size may  be a channel whereby  openness
works  negatively for growth.
Other  determinants  of government  size are  included  in the  regression,  following Ro-
drik's  specification.  The log of initial  per capita  income is negatively  related  to government
consumption.  Its  inclusion  into  the  regression  drives  much of the  positive  effect of trade
20However, Alesina and  Wacziarg (1997), using a wider sample of countries, have cast some doubt on
Rodrik's  results, by showing that  they  are sensitive to  the chosen specification and  to the  inclusion of
country size in the regression.
17policy  (the  sign of this  variable  is reversed  when  initial  income is excluded  from  the  re-
gression).  The  role of a large population  in limiting  the  size of govcrnmcnt  can be viewed
as the  result  of increasing returns  in the  provision of public goods  (Alesina and  Wacziarg,
(1997)).  These  may  result  from the partly  nonrival  character  of many such goods, such as
defense, diplomacy  and  the maintenance  of law and  order.  The signs of most  of the  other
determinants  of government  size arc as expected:  population  density  is associated  with  a
smaller  government,  perhaps  capturing  another  type  of scale effect.  Dependency  rates  are
associated  with  larger  governments,  in line with  the  idea that  government  consumption  is
likely to  respond  positively  to increased  schooling and  retirement  needs.
Table  IX:  Size  of  Government  Channel
Dep.  Var.:  Baseline  |  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  Regional
Govt.  Cons.  |  1970-89 |  Countries |  Dummies
Intercept  57.718  37.621  31.387  33.873  40.759
(10.58)  (22.73)  (8.14)  (8.50)  (7.88)
Log Initial  -4.439  -2.848  -0.875  -2.332  -2.463
Income  (-9.58)  (-32.57)  (-2.84)  (-5.93)  (-5.34)
Trade  Policy  0.154  0.121  0.034  0.102  0.249
Openness  (3.73)  (43.28)  (1.34)  (2.50)  (5.73)
BMP  0.008  0.004  0.006  0.006  0.007
(20.19)  (30.77)  (24.17)  (15.55)  (20.57)
Log Population  -0.911  -0.900  -1.856  -0.977  -0.726
(-4.52)  (-8.08)  (-7.45)  (-4.82)  (-3.25)
Population  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.004  -0.004
Density  (-5.87)  (-16.65)  (-8.59)  (-6.60)  (-6.47)
Population  16.262  32.549  -10.267  26.215  14.491
over 65  (1.54)  (4.94)  (0.79)  (2.85)  (1.39)
Population  1.653  18.525  14.574  18.595  12.093
under  15  (0.29)  (7.76)  (4.07)  (3.80)  (2.48)
Ethnolinguistic  0.038  0.039  0.107  0.056  0.032
Fractionalization  (3.23)  (5.26)  (12.21)  (4.66)  (1.97)
Latin  America  - - - - -6.095
Dummy  (-4.51)
South  East  Asia  - - - - -4.565
Dummy  (-3.18)
Sub-Saharan  - - - - -2.003
Africa Dummy  (-1.30)
OECD  Dummy  - - -- 5.846
(-3.91)
R-squared  .28 .28  .21 .29 .47  .25 .33  .29 .33  .35 .36
.42 .53  .55 .55  .47 .48  .46 .52  .48 .59
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (Whitc-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
184.4  Allocation  effects:  Distortions  and  Capital  Accumulation
4.4.1  Distortions  channel
The  baseline  model  displays  a  negative  but  insignificant  effect of trade  policy  on  price
distortions,  proxied  by the level of the  black market  premium,  once other  determinants  of
distortions  are  held  constant  (Table X).  A  10 point  increase  in the  trade  policy index  is
associated  with  a 3.4 percentage  point  reduction  in the  black market  premium,  although
the  slope parameter  is estimated  very imprecisely.  However, this effect becomes significant
at the  90% level in all other  specifications.  In particular,  the  estimated  coefficient become
large  economically  when  OECD  countries  are  excluded  from the  sample,  as we find that
a  10 point  increase  in  trade  policy  openness  reduces  the  black  market  premium  by  18
percentage  points.
Table X: Distortions  Channel
Dep.  Var:  Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  |  SUR  Regional
BMP  J 1970-89  |  Countries  l  Dummies
Intercept  39.720  80.849  168.293  124.906  104.804
(0.83)  (8.48)  (3.66)  (2.91)  (1.81)
Log Initial  -2.535  -5.314  -17.208  -11.666  -13.617
Income  (-0.43)  (-4.49)  (-2.78)  (-2.18)  (-1.90)
Trade Policy  -0.344  -0.855  -1.826  -0.900  -1.092
Openness  (-0.63)  (-7.56)  (-2.45)  (-1.77)  (-1.69)
Government  3.821  1.493  2.407  2.452  3.688
Consumption  (8.13)  (14.62)  (8.44)  (6.49)  (8.28)
Democracy  -51.987  -42.665  -46.554  -35.274  -56.272
(-4.69)  (-15.57)  (-3.65)  (-3.62)  (-4.74)
Population  -0.025  -0.012  -0.016  -0.027  -0.0004
Density  (-3.37)  (-10.16)  (-1.50)  (-3.77)  (-0.03)
Terms of Trade  71.589  -36.730  47.780  57.464  76.925
Shocks  (2.87)  (2.77)  (1.73)  (2.29)  (2.87)
Latin  America  - - - 44.517
Dummy  (3.55)
South  East  - - - -11.335
Asia Dummy  (-0.64)
Sub-Saharan  - - - 11.584
Africa Dummy  (0.89)
OECD  - - - 42.212
Dummy  (3.24)
R-squared  .19 .23  .17 .18 .06  .15 .28  .24 .29  .20 .27
.10 .27  .18 .23  .09 .17  .12 .27  .13 .33
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics  based on heteroskedastic-consistent  (White-Robust)  standard  errors,  in parentheses)
The  inclusion  of government  size,  which  enters  with  a positive  sign, provides  further
evidence of the  complementarity  between maintaining  a small level of public spending  and
policies aimed  at  ensuring  the  efficiency of the  price system.  Democracy,  measured  by an
19objective  index compiled  by Gastil  and  his followers for the  yearly Freedom  in the  World
reports,  is associated  with  lower distortions,  even when  controlling for initial  income.  This
may  reflect the  ability  of democracy  to  provide  a  check on  the  abuses  of policy-makers,
as argued  in Tavares  and Wacziarg  (1998).  Finally,  and  as expected,  a higher level of per
capita  income is associated  with  reduced  distortions.
4.4.2  Investment  channel
Trade  policy bears  a strong  and robust  poSitivc relationship  with  the  share of investment
in  GDP  (Table  XI).  This  constitutes  one  of the  main  findings of this  paper.  Estimates
from the baseline model suggest  that  a one standard  deviation  difference in the trade  policy
index  is directly  associated  with  a  3.2 percentage  point  increase  in the  ratio  of domestic
investment  to  GDP.  This  effect is robust  with  respect  to  alternative  models, although  its
magnitude  is reduced  when  the  1990-92 period  is brought  into the  picture.
Table  XI:  Investment  Channel
Dep.  Var:  Baseline  1970-92  [  Devel.  |  SUR  [  Regional
Inves.  Rate  1 1970-89  |  [  Countries  [Dummies
Intercept  27.493  12.459  8.243  15.498  25.778
(3.72)  (2.82)  (1.27)  (2.41)  (3.46)
Log Initial  1.003  2.609  2.746  2.414  1.277
Income  (1.56)  (6.59)  (5.38)  (4.25)  (1.98)
Trade  Policy  0.317  0.161  0.270  0.228  0.204
Openness  (6.72)  (9.77)  (7.04)  (5.40)  (4.40)
BMP  -0.010  -0.010  -0.006  -0.007  -0.007
(-7.15)  (-20.13)  (-18.60)  (-8.97)  (-5.70)
Macro Policy  1.027  0.609  0.381  0.390  0.250
Index  (6.97)  (9.79)  (5.31)  (3.16)  (1.88)
Population  -38.321  -33.230  -24.285  -30.457  -30.237
under  15  (-5.16)  (-7.54)  (-4.27)  (-4.12)  (-4.06)
Population  -88.353  -65.596  -67.586  -73.547  -88.871
over 65  (-5.45)  (-7.58)  (-2.66)  (-4.33)  (-5.90)
Ethnolinguistic  -0.047  -0.036  -0.014  -0.051  -0.058
Fractionaliz.  (-3.02)  (-4.37)  (-0.85)  (-3.43)  (-3.38)
Latin  America  - - - - -1.809
Dummy  (-1.35)
South  East  - - - - 3.778
Asia Dummy  (2.16)
Sub-Saharan  - - - - -2.227
Africa Dummy  (-1.57)
OECD  - - - - 3.520
Dummy  (2.30)
R-squared  .44 .56  .49 .60 .61  .21 .52  .49 .62  .53 .67
.61 .62  .73 .58  .57 .50  .62 .65  .69 .70
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent  (White-Robust) standard errors, in pa.rentheses)
20Other  determinants  of domestic  investment  include  life cycle  variables  (dependency
ratios),  ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  and  initial  income.  Contrary  to what  conditional
convergence would imply, the share of investment  in GDP is larger for richer countries when
other  determinants  of investment  are held  constant.  This  suggests that  the  forces behind
conditional  convergence  may  have little  to  do with  the  traditional  assumption  of dimin-
ishing  marginal  product  of capital,  but  perhaps  with  some form  of convergence-inducing
technological  transfers  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin,  1995).  Furthermore,  as expected,  a low
level of distortions  and  a high  quality  of macroeconomic  management  appear  conducive
to physical  capital  investment.
4.5  Technological  Transmissions
4.5.1  Manufactured  exports  channel
The  transmission  of technology,  proxied  by  the  ratio  of manufactured  exports  in  total
merchandise  exports,  is strongly  influenced  by trade  policy  (Table  XII).  In the  baseline
model, a 10 percentage  point  increase  in the policy component  of trade  shares is associated
with  a  6.35 percentage  point  rise in the manufactures  to  merchandise  exports  ratio.  Both
the magnitude  and the precision of the estimates  are robust  in four out of five specifications
of the  model.
Other  regressors  included  in this  equation  bear  the expected  signs:  population  density,
which  proxies  for  the  labor/land  ratio,  is positively  associated  with  the  export  share  of
manufactures  (presumed  to be relatively  labor intensive rather  than  land intensive);  human
capital,  measured  by the  proportion  of the  adult  population  having  completed  secondary
school,  captures  the  ratio  of skilled  to  unskilled  labor,  which  is also  expected  to  bear
a  positive  relationship  with  the  share  of manufactures  in  merchandise  exports.  Initial
income displays  a  positive  and  significant  estimated  coefficient.  All of these  conditioning
variables  can be  interpreted  as relative  endowments,  which  are  obvious  determinants  of
the  composition  of exports.
21Table  XII:  Manufactured  Exports  Channel
Dep.  Var:  | Baseline  1  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  Regional  1
Manuf.  Exp.  1970-89  |  |  Countries  _  Dummies
Intercept  -75.796  -82.105  -46.472  -73.793  -38.292
(-6.94)  (-12.76)  (-5.15)  (-8.23)  (-2.77)
Log Initial  7.289  8.482  3.718  7.497  5.310
Income  (5.18)  (11.15)  (4.32)  (6.99)  (3.18)
Trade  Policy  0.635  0.567  -0.369  0.676  0.619
Openness  (4.59)  (10.15)  (-4.82)  (6.87)  (4.32)
BMP  -0.013  -0.024  -0.024  -0.020  -0.019
(-5.49)  (-22.95)  (-19.90)  (-14.81)  (-7.69)
Secondary  Sch.  0.291  0.205  1.743  0.232  0.164
Completion  (3.09)  (2.41)  (19.75)  (2.57)  (2.05)
Log Population  5.215  5.216  3.451  4.964  4.219
(5.68)  (8.76)  (4.92)  (5.53)  (5.18)
Population  0.019  0.014  0.015  0.017  0.020
Density  (5.22)  (9.10)  (7.33)  (4.91)  (6.05)
Latin  America  - -20.070
Dummy  (-5.17)
South  East  - -18.118
Asia Dummy  (-3.97)
Sub-Saharan  - -18.010
Africa Dummy  (-4.65)
OECD  - - - -5.017
Dummy  (-1.15)
R-squared  .50 .52  .48 .48 .43  .21 .38  .51 .53  .55 .59
.49 .53  .51 .50  .34 .53  .49 .53  .54 .62
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
4.5.2  Foreign  Direct  Investment  Channel
Foreign direct  investment  appears  to be a complement,  rather  than  as substitute  to trade
policy openness  (Table  XIII).  A  10 points  change in the  trade  policy  index  is associated
with  a  0.46% direct  increase  in  the  FDI  to  GDP  ratio,  which  represents  about  50% of
this  variable's  mean,  a large effect indeed.  Countries  with lower distortions,  which in turn
attracts  more FDI. A similar  effect holds for countries  with relatively  smaller governments.
Non-distortionary  policies, a commitment  to non-interventionist  policies and free trade  all
appear  conducive  to  attracting  foreign  capital.  In  turn,  the  effect of FDI  on  growth  can
be interpreted  as a technological  transmission  mechanism,  since FDI  represents  too small
an effect on  the  growth  of the  domestic  capital  stock  to  represent  a direct  accumulation
effect.2'  The estimates  from the  FDI  channel equation  are robust  across the five variants
21Wc  tried  to  use  the  investment  rate  net  of the  foreign  direct  investment  rate  in  the  investment  channel,
to better  separate  the  two  effects.  The  results  for  both  equations  were  similar.  However,  the  precision  of
the  parameter  estimate  for  the  trade  policy  coefficient  in  the  investment  equation  decreased  somewhat.  At
22of the baseline model. Furthermore, isolating developing countries lcads to a doubling of
the trade policy coefficient.
Among the other determinants of FDI, former colonies having gained independence
after the  Second World War tend  to attract  more FDI,  other things equal.  This may
reflect privileged economic  ties between certain countrics and their former colonizers.
Table XIII:  Foreign Direct  Investment  Channel
Dep.  Var.:  Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  Regional
FDI share  1970-89  Countries  Dummies
Intercept  1.177  1.124  1.805  1.149  1.679
(5.73)  (8.52)  (13.55)  (7.24)  (4.90)
Trade Policy  0.045  0.059  0.085  0.036  0.057
Openness  (4.01)  (9.62)  (13.82)  (3.41)  (4.29)
BMP  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.0002
(-3.60)  (-20.54)  (-3.48)  (-3.09)  (-0.92)
Government  -0.054  -0.048  -0.047  -0.051  -0.060
Consumption  (-4.15)  (-11.70)  (-6.67)  (-4.36)  (-5.82)
Postwar  0.928  1.009  0.329  0.787  0.634
Dummy  (3.96)  (6.17)  (1.92)  (3.41)  (3.23)
Island Dummy  0.988  1.192  1.239  1.076  0.943
____  _  (4.74)  (6.07)  (13.17)  (4.87)  (4.29)
Latin America  - - - - 0.086
Dummy  l_l_l_(0.31)
South East  - - - - 0.150
Asia Dummy  __________  (0.36)
Sub-Saharan  - - - - -0.261
Africa Dummy  _  (-1.34)
OECD  - - - - -0.748
Dummy  _  (-1.96)
R-squared  .33 .36  .22 .32 .31  .45 .50  .34 .35  .37 .39
.28 .23  .24 .26  .40 .29  .28 .23  .35 .24
Obs. (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
any rate, FDI represents  a very  small  fraction  of total domestic  capital forma.tion  in our sample.
235  Summary  of the  Channel  Effects  and Robustness  Analysis
5.1  Analyzing  the  channel  effects  in the  baseline  model
The summary of the channel effect of trade policy on growth, based on the baseline model,
is given in Table XIV, which reports the effects of each channel on growth and the effect of
trade policy on each channel. The last column displays the product of the two coefficients.
The t-statistics for the channel effects are obtained by computing linear approximations
of the products of the parameters around the estimated parameter values, and applying
the usual formula for the variance of linear functions of random variables to this linear
approximation. Computing these standard errors is possible thanks to the joint estimation
of all the equations in the system, which allows the derivation of the covariance matrix for
all of the estimated parameters.  In the baseline model, three of the six channels involve
statistically significant effects of trade policy openness on growth at the 90% level. The
overall effect, once all the channels have been added, is significant at the 99% level.
Table XIV: Summary  of Channel  Effects  (Baseline  Model)
Channel  Effect of the  Effect of Trade  Effect  of  Jrade
| Channel on Growth  Policy  on Channel j Policy  on Growth
Distortions  -0.007  -0.344  0.002
(-9.08)  (-0.63)  (0.63)
Government  -0.042  0.154  -0.007
Consumption  (-1.57)  (3.73)  (-1.52)
Manufactured  0.004  0.635  0.002
Exports  (0.45)  (4.59)  (0.45)
Investment  0.143  0.317  0.045
Rate  (6.86)  (6.72)  (5.12)
Foreign Direct  0.320  0.045  0.014
Investment  (4.68)  (4.01)  (3.79)
Macro Policy  0.489  0.027  0.013
Quality  (4.22)  (2.19)  (1.90)
Total  Effect  0.071
(5.94)
(t-ststistics  based on heteroskedastic-consistent  (White-Robust)  standard errors in parentheses)
According to Table XIV, trade policy openness works positively for growth through
five out of six of the channels. Some channels are weak in magnitude: reduced distortions
account for roughly 3% of the net effect of open trade policy openness on growth, and is
statistically insignificant. This is a surprising result in light of the importance that alloca-
tive efficiency  has received in the arguments about static and dynamic gains from trade.
The same holds for the manufactured exports  channel, meant to  capture  technological
transmissions.  The government size channel works negatively for growth, although the
effect is weak both in terms of magnitude and in terms of statistical significance. Differ-
ences in the quality of macroeconomic  policy and in the ratio of FDI to GDP appear to
be relatively important channels, each accounting for roughly 20% of the total  effects of
trade policy on growth.
24The  most  important  channel  by  far seems  to  be the  investment  rate.  It  accounts  for
close to  63% of the  total  effect of trade  policy on growth,  a somewhat  unexpected  result.
Several theoretical  arguments  point  to the potential  direct  impact  of trade  policy openness
on investment,  such as those outlined  in section  2.1.2.  However, dominant  theories  about
dynamic  gains from  trade  generally  do not  put  physical  capital  accumulation  directly  at
the  center  of their  logic,  although  the  returns  to  capital  are  predicted  to  increase  as  a
result  of openness  in most  of these  theories.
Furthermore,  theories  that  stress  the  favorable  effects of trade  openness  on  capital
accumulation  are  often  of a  static  nature.  Either  through  its  pro-competitive  effects of
through  enhanced  efficiency in  the  sectoral  composition  of output,  openness  raises  the
steady  state  capital-labor  ratio,  which  requires  more  investment  in the  transition  to  the
steady  state.  Common  estimates  of the  speed  of convergence  to  the  steady  state  (2%)
suggest that  this convergence might be rather  slow, implying that  a country  that  liberalizes
might experience  a rather  lasting surge in its investment  ratio,  before the marginal  product
of capital  falls  back  to  its steady  state  level.  Since many  of the  countries  in our  sample
liberalized  their  trade  regimes either  during  the period  under  consideration,  or just  before,
our  estimate  of the  investment  effects of trade  policy  openness  might  well be  capturing
this  transitional  effect.
Long-run  effects of trade  openness on growth  are also theoretically  possible.  In the  en-
dogenous  growth literature,  any mechanism  that  prevents  the  marginal  product  of capital
from  falling  to  zero  spurs  growth  by  preventing  a  fall  in the  rate  of investment.  Tech-
nological  transmissions,  improved  policy quality  and  allocative  efficiency are  thought  to
work mainly  by raising  the productivity  of factors,  and  generate  long-run  growth  through
endogenous  mechanisms.  However, given our  methodology,  such an effect should show up
through  the technological  transmissions,  distortions  or policy quality  channels.
Another  possible explanations  for the  results  is that  measurement  error  in some of the
channel  variables  leads us  to overstate  the  effect of trade  policy via  investment.  Indeed,
if investment  is positively  correlated  with  technological  transmissions,  and  the  share  of
manufactured  exports  in  total  merchandise  exports  is  a  weak  proxy  for  the  extent  of
technological transmissions,  then  part  of this effect will be accounted  for by the investment
channel.  This  again,  seems  to  point  to  the  logical  complementarity  between  physical
capital  accumulation  and  the  overall improvement  in the  productivity  of existing  factors.
A similar  argument  could  be made  concerning  price  distortions.  However,  the  scope  of
this  argument  is somewhat  limited  by  the  fact  that  we are  using  instruments  for  all of
the  channel  variables:  if the measurement  errors  in the instruments  are uncorrelated  with
measurement  errors  in  the  channel  variables,  the  incidence  of attenuation  bias  will be
greatly  reduced.
To summarize,  this model provides strong  evidence in favor of the beneficial total  effect
of trade  policy  on  growth.  A  10 percentage  point  increase  in  the  trade  policy  measure,
which corresponds  roughly to one standard  deviation,  is associated  with  a 0.71 percentage
point  increase  in the  annual  growth  rate  once all of the channels  of influence  are brought
into  the  picture.  This  effect  is  estimated  with  great  precision.  The  most  important
channels  by  far  seem to  be  through  investment  (63% of the  total  effect).  Technological
transmissions,  according to our accounting  framework,  explain 22.5% of the overall positive
effect of trade  on growth,  and macroeconomic  policy quality  accounts  for 18% of this effect.
255.2  Robustness  analysis
5.2.1  Robustness  to  the  Specification
We now turn  to the  analysis  of sensitivity  for our model.  Table  XV contains  the  channel
decomposition  of the  impact  of trade  on  growth  in the  five different  specifications  of the
model.  In addition  to the t-statistics,  this  channel  also contains  Wald tests  for the signifi-
cance of the products  of coefficients.  These Wald  statistics  are asymptotically  distributed
as x2 variables  with  1 degree of freedom.  As the table  shows, the  p-values implied  by the
t-tests  and  those obtained  from the  Wald tests  are very similar.  Figure  1 displays the  six
channels  graphically.
Table XV.  Channel  Effects  under Alternative  Models
I  II  III  IV  V  VI I  Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  Regional
1970-89  Countries  Dummies
Distortions  0.002  0.005  0.009  0.005  0.007
(0.63)  (7.28)  (2.51)  (1.73)  (1.71)
Wald  Test  0.399  53.042  6.315  2.983  2.924
p-value  (0.53)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.09)
Govt.  -0.007  -0.007  -0.001  -0.004  -0.011
Consump.  (-1.52)  (-5.85)  (-1.14)  (-1.57)  (-1.93)
Wald  Test  2.309  34.184  1.291  2.477  3.709
p-value  (0.13)  (0.00)  (0.26)  (0.12)  (0.05)
Manuf.  0.002  0.001  -0.002  0.005  -0.003
Exports  (0.45)  (0.53)  (-1.00)  (1.11)  (-0.70)
Wald Test  0.201  0.282  0.994  1.228  0.490
p-value  (0.65)  (0.60)  (0.32)  (0.27)  (0.48)
Investment  0.045  0.021  0.039  0.033  0.022
Rate  (5.12) l  (7.98)  (5.20)  (4.37) l  (3.54)
Wald Test  26.199 l  63.639  27.076  19.075 l  12.567
p-value  |  (0.00) |  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) |  (0.00)
Foreign Dir.  0.014  0.015  0.023  0.013 l  0.010
Investment  1  (3.79) |  (6.02)  (4.90)  (3.46) |  (2.37)
Wald Test  14.385  |  36.236  24.058  11.967J  5.637
p-value  |  (0.00) |  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) |  (0.02)
| Macro Policy  0.013  0.011 [  0.017  0.016  0.004
Quality  (1.90) 1  (4.24)  (3.36)  (2.84) |  (1.18)
Wald Test  3.609 }  17.980 f  11.293  8.078  1.402
p-value  (0.06) l  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) |  (0.24)
Total  Effect  0.071 T  0.046  0.085  0.067  0.030
l  l  (5.94)  (11.71)  (7.85)  (5.73)  (2.38)
Wald  Test  35.332 |  137.215  61.624  32.888  5.688
p-value  (0.00)  |  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  |  (0.02)
26Column  III  shows that,  when  adding  the  1990-92 time  period,  most  of the  previously
insignificant  effects become significant.  Although  the  addition  of this  time period  reduces
the  number  of observations,  it  raises  by  20% the  amount  of data  used to  estimate  each
parameter  compared  to  the  case where  only four  time  periods  are  used.  The  signs  and
relative  magnitudes  of most  of the  effects arc  maintained.  The  reduction  in  the  overall
effect,  from  0.71 to  0.46,  is almost  entirely  due  to  a  reduction  in the  investment  chan-
nel.  Distortions  and  government  size become  statistically  significant  channels,  although
relatively  small  in magnitude.
Column  IV  shows that  the  effect  of trade  policy  on economic  growth  is actually  in-
creased  when the  sample is restricted  to developing  countries.  This is due to the  fact that
the distortions  channel is now significant,  and represents  roughly 10% of the  overall effect.
The other  channels  are preserved.  Column V shows that  changing  the estimator  used for
the  analysis  does not  greatly  affect  the  sign and  magnitude  of the  estimated  effects.  In
fact, the overall effect of trade  policy is roughly preserved  compared  to the baseline  model.
Our estimator  does not allow for country  specific fixed effects that  can covary with  the
right-hand  side  variables  in the  various  equations.  Accounting  for country  specific fixed
effects would involve  rewriting  the  econometric  theory  underlying  the  estimation  proce-
dure,  a task  that  is left for future  research.  However, in order to account  for the possibility
that  regional  specificities  might  be the  driving  force of the  results,  regional  dummies  for
Latin  America,  Sub-Saharan  Africa, South East  Asia and the OECD  countries  were added
to  each of the  channel  equations,  as well as to the  list of instruments  (Column  VI).  Since
accounting  for fixed  effects tends  to  wipe  out  much  of the  cross-sectional  variation  (the
fixed effects estimator  uses  only  the  variation  within  regions  across time,  discarding  the
between-country  variation),  we should  expect  the  inclusion  of these variables  to  lower the
estimated  effects  of trade  policy.  This  is indeed  the  case,  as shown  in  Figure  1.  The
total  effect of trade  policy is reduced  by the  inclusion  of region specific dummies,  but  the
respective  shares  of each channel  are roughly  preserved.  In particular,  the  dominant  role
of physical  capital  formation  is maintained.
To  summarize,  the  main  message  of this  paper,  namely  that  trade  policy  openness
works mostly  through  the  rate  of physical  capital  investment,  appears  robust  to  a variety
of modifications  of the  baseline  model.
5.2.2  Robustness  to  the  Time  Coverage
In  order  to  examine  the  robustness  of the  model  with  respect  to  its  time  coverage,  and
therefore  with  respect  to  the  cross-equation  parameter  equality  restrictions,  we excluded
each  time  period  from  the  baseline  model  one  at  a  time.  Furthermore,  the  exogenous
variables  corresponding  to the  excluded period  were removed from the  list of instruments.
The resulting  channel  effects are presented  in  Table XVI. We should  expect  the  precision
of the parameter  estimates  to be greatly  reduced,  as we are now throwing  out 25% of the
data  in each case.  This  is indeed the  case, as the  t-statistics  on most of the channel effects
are  considerably  lower when  only three  time  periods  are  used for estimation.  For exam-
ple, the  macroeconomic  policy and  government  size channels  no longer appear  significant
statistically.  However,  both  the  signs  and  magnitudes  of the  estimates  are  remarkably
close to  those  of the  baseline  model.  In particular,  the  investment  effect is preserved  in
27all specifications,  and  in  all but  one case the  overall effect  of trade  policy remains  of the
same magnitude.  This  provides  evidence that  the  estimates  are robust  with respect  to the
time  period  coverage.
Table  XVI  - Sensitivity  to  the  Time  Period  Coverage
[___________  |excl.  1970-84  excl.  1975-79 | excl.  1980-84  excl.  1985-89
Distortions  -0.007  -0.002  0.013  0.001
(-1.15)  (-0.37)  (1.30)  (0.07)
Wald Test  1.315  0.133  1.679  0.005
p-value  (0.25)  (0.72)  (0.20)  (0.94)
Government  -0.006  0.002  0.005  -0.010
Consumption  (-1.09)  (0.19)  (0.62)  (-1.53)
Wald Test  1.196  0.035  0.391  2.351
p-value  (0.27)  (0.85)  (0.53)  (0.13)
Manufactured  0.013  0.009  0.004  0.010
Exports  (1.83)  (0.89)  (0.54)  (0.70)
Wald Test  3.357  0.792  0.294  0.494
p-value  (0.07)  (0.37)  (0.59)  (0.48)
Investment  0.032  0.093  0.021  0.035
Rate  (2.62)  (5.05)  (1.80)  (2.07)
Wald Test  6.863  25.508  3.229  4.281
p-value  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.04)
Foreign Dir.  0.021  0.004  0.012  0.016
Investment  (4.09)  (1.17)  (2.43)  (2.41)
Wald Test  16.705  1.368  5.924  5.830
p-value  (0.00)  (0.24)  (0.01)  (0.02)
Macro  -0.026  0.001  0.008  0.009
Policy  (-1.98)  (0.11)  (0.78)  (1.08)
Wald Test  3.906  0.013  0.610  1.163
p-value  (0.05)  (0.91)  (0.43)  (0.28)
Total  Effect  0.027  0.108  0.061  0.060
l___________  l(1.48)  (3.87)  (3.62)  (2.53)
Wald Test  2.203  15.008  13.140  6.399
p-value  (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)
5.3  Exhaustiveness  of  the  model
The last  concern  that  we address  is that  the  six channels  considered  above may  not  fully
capture  the  total  effect  of trade  policy  on  growth.  In particular,  we may  have  omitted
one channel or more, leading  both  to an incomplete  characterization  of the effects of trade
policy  and  to  potential  biases  in  the  estimates  of the  included  channels  (insofar  as the
omitted  channels  covary with  the included  ones in the  growth  regression).
285.3.1  Other  possible  channels
We start  with  a brief discussion  of other  possiblc  linkages which  may  have becn  omitted
from the system.  Firstly,  the accumulation  of human  capital  might be onc of the channels
linking trade  policy and  economic  growth.  Indeed,  if trade  openness  modifies the  relative
returns  to  factors,  then  it  may  create  greater  incentives  to  accumulatc  human  capital.
For instance,  if an open  trade  policy spurs  technological  transmissions,  and  if technology
and  skills are complements,  then  trade  openness  will increase  the  returns  to accumulating
human  capital.  However, specifying  a human  capital  channel  led to no  significant linkage
effect:  the coefficient on the trade  policy variable was essentially  zero oncc other  determi-
nants  of human  capital  formation,  such as per  capita income, were held constant.  This was
robust  with  respect  to the  inclusion  of a diverse  set of controls.  Furthermore,  the  effects
of human  capital  on  growth  are  not  robust  in our growth  specification,  a problem  which
is compounded  by  the  opposite  signs  of male  and  female  human  capital.  Hence, human
capital  does not appear  to be an important  channel linking  trade  policy  and growth.
We  carried  out  a  similar  exercise  for  income  inequality.  Neoclassical  trade  theory
provides  several tools for the  analysis of income distribution  in relation  to trade  openness.
For example,  the simple factor  endowments  theory  of Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson  predicts
that  when a relatively  unskilled labor  abundant  country  moves from autarky  to free trade,
returns  to unskilled labor  should  increase  in relative  terms,  with  presumed  positive  effects
on  income distribution.  In turn,  there  are reasons  to believe  that  inequality  has an effect
on growth,  although  the  direction  of this  effect appears  a priori  ambiguous.  Alesina  and
Perotti  (1993),  among  others,  have  studied  the  issue  of distribution  and  growth.  They
argue that  when the poor have a larger weight in the political decision making process, they
tend  to vote  for transfer  schemes that  involve distortive  (i.e.  growth  reducing)  taxation.
Empirically,  they  report  that  more  unequal  societies  tend  to  display  lower growth  rates,
once  other  determinants  of growth  are  held  constant.  However,  including  a  measure  of
income  inequality  (the  Gini  coefficient)  in  the  basic  growth  regression  gave  rise  to  an
insignificant  effect.  Furthermore,  the  effect  of trade  policy  on  income  inequality,  once
controlling for the  level of per  capita  income, was found  to be essentially  zero.  Hence, the
income inequality  channel does not appear  to  operate  either,  although  the poor quality  of
cross-country  inequality  data  may  be the  source of this  result.2 2
5.3.2  Unconditional  effect  of trade  policy  openness
The  unconditional  effect  of trade  policy  on  growth  can be  calculated  by  removing all  of
the  channel  variables  from the  growth  regression,  and  including  the  trade  policy index in
their  place  (Table  XVII).  The  resulting  estimate  suggests  a  strong  association  between
the  trade  regime and  growth:  A 10 percentage  point  increase  in the  trade  policy index  is
associated  with  a 0.66 percentage  point  increase  in the annual  growth rate  in the baseline
model.
With  the exclusion of many variables  from the growth equation,  the  trade  policy index
now captures  much of the  portion  of their  effect on  growth  that  is not  necessarily  linked
to  trade  policy.  However, this  coefficient  is useful  in that  it  provides  us  with  a  rough
22Results  for the income  inequality  and human capital channels  are available  from the author upon
request.
29order  of magnitude  against  which  to  compare  the  total  effect of trade  policy  computed
above.  Indeed,  in all five models,  the  unconditional  effect of trade  policy  (where we take
'unconditional'  to mean  that  we are not  conditioning  on the  channel  variables)  is roughly
of the  same  magnitude  as the  total  effect  of trade  policy  computed  in  Table  XV.  This
increases  our  confidence that  no major  channel  has been  omitted.23
Table  XVII.  Unconditional  Effect  of  Trade  Policy  in  the  Growth  Regression
Baseline  [ 1970-92  Devel.  [  SUR  [ Regional
l____________  1970-89  [  [  Countries  [Dummies  l
Intercept  2.666  1.744  1.686  4.159  4.780
(1.42)  (2.24)  (1.13)  (2.34)  (1.61)
Log Initial  -0.078  0.037  0.006  -0.259  -0.086
Income  (-0.32)  (0.38)  (0.03)  (-1.12)  (-0.23)
Male Human  0.725  0.948  1.893  0.671  -0.285
Capital  (2.11)  (5.30)  (13.54)  (2.18)  (-0.92)
Female  Human  -0.926  -1.265  -1.840  -0.837  0.019
Capital  (-3.04)  (-8.02)  (-7.48)  (-2.99)  (0.06)
Trade  Policy  0.066  0.061  0.095  0.091  0.073
Openness  (3.00)  (7.18)  (5.97)  (4.44)  (2.93)
Latin  America  - - - -2.198
Dummy  (-6.74)
South  East  - - - 0.970
Asia Dummy  (1.77)
Sub-Saharan  - - - -3.090
Africa Dummy  (-5.70)
OECD  - - - -1.438
Dummy  (-3.71)
R-squared  .12 .06  .12 .09 .09  .23 .20  .12 .06  .11 .31
.09 .03  .04 .11  .22 .02  .08 .03  .45 .11
Obs  (Periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
5.3.3  Tests  based  on  the  residuals  from  the  growth  equation
A perhaps  more formal test of exhaustiveness  can be carried  out by regressing the residual
vector  from the growth  regression  on the  index of trade  policy.  If any  significant  channel
has  been  left out of the growth  regression,  this  should  generate  some correlation  between
the estimated  residual  and  the  measure  of trade  openness.  The  results  presented  in Table
XVIII,  based  on  a  seemingly  unrelated  regression  estimator,  show  that  this  is not  the
case.24 In most  of the models,  the  residual  effect of trade  policy is generally  positive,  but
23A  remaining  possibility  is  that  we  have  omitted  an  important  negative  channel  and  an  offsetting
positive  channel,  although  this  would  be  an  unlikely  coincidence.
2 4Again,  this should  not  be taken  as an  absolute  proof  of exhaustiveness.  To the  extent  that  potentially
omitted  channels  covary with  the included  ones,  then  the  latter  will pick up the  effects of trade  policy  that
should  be  accounted  for by  the  missing  channels;  this  would  be  reflected  by a lower  correlation  between
the  growth  residual  and trade  policy  openness.  However,  this  test  provides  yet  another  indication  that  no
major  channel  has been  omitted.
30not  significantly  different  from  zero  at  any  reasonable  level of significance.  This,  again,
reinforces  our  confidence in the  exhaustiveness  of the  model.  The fact  that  the estimates
are  generally  positive  shows that,  if anything,  our  channel  methodology  has  uncovered  a
lower bound  on the  total  effect of trade  openness.  In the  only case where  the  estimate  is
negative,  the  effect is very small  in magnitude.
Table  XVIII.  Regression  of the  residuals  from  the  growth  equation  on  the
trade  policy  index
1  Baseline  1970-92  Devel.  SUR  Regional
|__________  |1970-89  |  Countries  |  Dummies
Intercept  0.033  0.042  -0.183  0.048  -0.138
(0.18)  (0.24)  (-0.81)  (0.30)  (-0.94)
Trade  Policy  0.013  0.019  -0.004  0.010  0.019
Openness  (0.83)  (1.20)  (-0.25)  (0.64)  (1.36)
R-squared  .0009 .01  .00003 .007  .07 .07  .000004 .006  .002 .01
.02  .0002  .02  .005  .02  .01  .04  .02  .00003  .03  .002
Obs.  (periods)  57(4)  49(5)  36(4)  57(4)  57(4)
(t-statistics based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-Robust) standard errors, in parentheses)
6  Conclusion
This paper  constitutes  the first attempt  to empirically evaluate,  in a cross-country  context,
the  respective  roles  of various  theories  of  dynamic  gains  from  trade  in  explaining  the
observed  positive  impact  of trade  openness  on economic  growth.  Trade  openness  affects
growth  mainly  by  raising  the  ratio  of domestic  investment  to  GDP.  Depending  on  the
specification,  the  rate  of physical  capital  accumulation  explains  between  46% and  63%
of the  impact  of trade  policy  on  economic  growth.  Foreign  Direct  Investment,  used  as
a  proxy  for technological  transmissions,  and  the  quality  of macroeconomic  policies  each
account  for  roughly  20% of the  overall  effect.  Lastly,  we found  weak evidence  that  the
size of government,  measured  by  the  ratio  of public  consumption  to  GDP,  constitutes  a
channel  whereby  trade  policy  affects economic  growth  negatively.
The  lack of statistically  significant  results  concerning  manufactured  exports  and  dis-
tortions  may  be  due  to  measurement  problems.  These  are  the  two  channels  for  which
measurement,  although  improving  on past  attempts,  is still subject  to considerable  short-
comings.  The black market  premium  may be a weak proxy  for the overall efficiency of the
price system.  International  technological  transmissions  are extremely  hard  to  measure  as
well, resulting  perhaps  in a downward  bias in the estimates  corresponding  to this  channel,
and  a  concurrent  overstatement  of the  other  channels.  Future  research  should  seek to
improve  upon  the  measures  used in this  study.
The  important  role of investment  in physical  capital  poses  a serious  theoretical  chal-
lenge.  While  some theories  about  gains from trade  do predict  positive  effects of openness
on the rate  of return  to capital,  these  effects should be captured  either  by the distortions  or
the  technological  transmissions  channels.  Furthermore,  theories  based  on  dynamic  gains
from technological  transmissions  and  efficiency improvements  center  on the  improvement
31of the overall productivity  of factors,  rather  than  on the acceleration  of their accumulation.
If specialization  is limited  by the  extent  of the  market,  under  increasing  returns  to scale
theories,  trade  openness  should  allow entrepreneurs  to  undertake  previously  unprofitable
investments.  Theories  based  on  such  a  'Big  Push'  may  provide  useful  insights  into  the
nature  of dynamic  gains from trade.2 5 Further  theoretical  investigations  into the  interplay
between  investment  rates,  trade  openness  and  growth seem called  for.
2oRcsults presented  in appendix  V, howevcr,  suggests  that  such theories  may  not  provide  the full picture.
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34Appendix I. List of countries
OECD  Asia  |  Latin America  Africa
Australia  Cyprus  Argentina  Ghana
Austria  India  Barbados  Kenya
Belgium  Israel  Brazil  Malawi
Canada  Jordan  Colombia  Mauritius
Finland  Korea  Costa Rica  Sierra Leone
France  Malaysia  Dominican Republic  South Africa
Germany, West  Myanmar (Burma)  El Salvador  Tanzania
Greece  Pakistan  Guyana  The Gambia
Ireland  Philippines  Mexico  Tunisia
Italy  Singapore  Paraguay  Zaire
Japan  Sri Lanka  Peru  Zambia
Netherlands  Syria  Venezuela








United Kingdom  .
35Appendix II: Data Sources and Description
Variable Name:  Growth
Source:  Summers-Heston  v.  5.6
Unit: % points
Description:  Growth  rate  of PPP  adjusted  Gross Domestic  Product
Variable Name:  Import  duties  as  a  % of total  imports
Source: IMF-IFS  and IMF-GFS
Unit:  % points
Description:  Import  duties  in  local  currency  as  a  percentage  of total  imports  in  local
currency.
Variable Name:  Pre-Uruguay  Round  NTB  coverage
Source:  UNCTAD/World  Bank
Unit:  % points
Description:  Coverage rate  of non-tariff  barriers  pre-Uruguay  Round
Variable Name:  Sachs  and  Warner  Liberalization  Status
Source:  Sachs-Warner  (1995)
Unit:  Values ranging  from 0 to  1.
Description:  For  each  year,  a  dummy  variable  was constructed  based  on  the  years  of
liberalization  in Sachs and  Warner  (1995). Liberalized  countries  took  a value of 1, closed
countries took a value of zero.  The data  were averaged  over the relevant 5 year sub-periods.
Variable Name:  Manufactured  Exports  Share
Source: World Bank
Unit:  % points
Description:  Share  of manufactured  goods  in merchandise  exports
Variable Name:  FDI  ratio
Source:  IMF
Unit:  % points
Description:  Ratio  of gross Foreign Direct  Investment  inflows to  GDP.
Variable Name:  Democracy
Source: Gastil  (Freedom  In the  World  Reports,  various issues)
Unit: Takes values from 0 (non-democracy)  to 1 (country  with fully developed  democratic
institutions)
Description:  Index  of how democratic  institutions  are  (regular  elections,  broad  franchise,
wide access to office and  relevance of elected  officials).
Variable Name:  Initial  Income
Source:  Summers-Heston  v.  5.6
Unit:  Log of per  capita  GDP  in Dollars
Description:  Real Gross  Domestic Product  per  capita  in a given year  (PPP  adjusted)
36Variable Name:  Human  Capital
Source:  Barro-Leo
Unit: Years
Description:  Average years of secondary  and  higher education  in the total  population  over
age 25.
Variable Name:  Secondary  School  Completion  Rate
Source:  Barro-Lee
Unit: %
Description:  Percentage  of "secondary  school complete"  in the  total  population.
Variable Name:  Macroeconomic  Policy  Quality
Source:  Wacziarg  /  World Bank  /  IMF
Unit:  index
Description:  Index  of macroeconomic  policy  quality.  Constructed  by  ranking  countries
according  to  the public  debt  to GDP  ratio,  deficit to GDP  ratio  and  growth  of MI net  of
total  output  growth  and  assigning  values from  1 to  10 to each decile,  then  averaging the
three  resulting  indicators.  Index  also ranges  from 1 to  10.  Higher  numbers  signal better
policies.
Variable Name:  Black  Market  Premium
Source: Tavares-Wacziarg  data  set,  initially  World  Currency  Yearbook  and  IMF.
Unit:  (Black market  rate-official  rate)/official  rate.  %
Description:  Black market  premium  on  the official exchange  rate.
Variable Name:  Public  Consumption
Source: Summers-Heston  v.  5.
Unit:  %
Description:  Share  of government  consumption  of goods and  services  in GDP,  excluding
transfers  and  public investment.
Variable Name:  Population  over  65
Source: Barro-Lee
Unit:  %
Description:  Share  of population  aged  over 65 in the  total  population
Variable Name:  Population  over  15
Source: Barro-Lee
Unit:  %
Description:  Share  of population  aged over  15 in the  total  population
Variable Name:  Terms  of  Trade  Shocks
Source: Tavares-Wacziarg,  initially  from the World  Bank.
Unit:  %.  A  positive  value  means  terms  of trade  move favorably,  a  negative  value  the
opposite.
Description:  Growth  rate  of manufactured  export  priccs minus  growth  rate  of manufac-
tured  import  price
37Variable Name:  Population
Source:  Barro-Lee
Unit: Logarithm  of population.
Description:  Country  population
Variable Name:  Population  Density
Source:  Barro-Lee
Unit:  1000 population  per  million square  km
Description:  Population  density
Variable Name:  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization
Source: Mauro  (1994)
Unit: Probability.
Description:  Probability  that  two randomly  selected  persons  from  a  given country  will
not belong  to the  same  ethnolinguistic  group.
Variable Name:  Postwar  Independence
Source:  Barro-Lee
Unit: Dummy variable
Description:  Takes  on  a value  of 1 if the  country  gained  independence  after  the  Second
World War.
38Appendix  III.  Issues in Measurement
A-III-1.  The  Trade Policy Index.
Section 2.2.1 discusses the conceptual basis of the trade policy index used throughout
the paper.  This part of the appendix describes the actual computation of the index in
more detail.  Table A-III-I displays the results of the  regression used to construct the
weights on the three components of trade policy, namely import duties as a share of total
imports, the per-Uruguay round NTB coverage ratio and the Sachs-Warner liberalization
status indicator (averaged over the relevant five-year time periods).  The regression also
features gravity components such as land area and the log of population, as well as the
growth rate  (Appendix IV provides evidence of reverse causation from growth to trade
shares).
Table A-III-I.  Trade Volumes  Regression
L Dependent  Variable:  l  3SLS*
Imports  +  Exports  /  GDP  |  I
Constant  182.561
(9.70)
Growth of per capita income  0.322
(1.12)
Land Area  -8.029
(-3.69)
Log of Population  -9.121
(-3.42)
Import duties over total imports  -34.733
(-1.16)
Pre-Uruguay Round NTB coverage  -0.217
(-0.73)
Sachs/Warner liberalization status  11.2622
(2.12)
Adj. R-squared  .60 .55 .53 .49
#  of obs. (#  of periods)  71 (4)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
* The instruments  used were: Initial income,  population  density,  religious  dummies,  oil producer
dummy,  postwar  independence  dummy,  log  of population,  share of population  over  65, log of area.
As expected, the share of import duties in total  imports and the NTB coverage ratio
receive a negative weight in the index, while the liberalization status  receives a positive
weight.  The lack of precision of the estimates, largely due to  collinearity between the
policy measures, is not really a source of concern since the objective is only to generate
weights that provide a rough notion of how the three components effectively  impact trade
volumes. Minor variations in these weights are not likely to affect the final results. 26
26In fact,  the  results  for  the channels  model  are  not very  sensitive  to the  inclusion  of  NTBs  in the  index.
39For each period,  the  trade  policy openness  index was computed  as:
Trade  Policy =  -34.73*(Import  Duty  Share)  - 0.217*(NTB)  +  11.262*(Liber.  Status)
Table  A-III-II  contains  correlations  betwcen  the  resulting  trade  policy  index  and  its
various  components  for the  time  periods  under  consideration.  This  shows that  the liber-
alization  status  and  the  duty  ratio  receive the  greatest  weight  in the  index,  although  the
correlation  of NTBs  with  the  overall index is substantial.
Table  A-III-II.  Correlations  between  the  Components  of  the  Index  and  the
Index  Itself
Index  Index  Index  Index
1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-90
Duty  70-74  -0.72  -0.70  -0.67  -0.64
Duty  75-79  -0.72  -0.75  -0.72  -0.69
Duty  80-84  -0.66  -0.68  -0.73  -0.71
Duty  85-90  -0.63  -0.64  -0.70  -0.77
NTB  -0.47  -0.48  -0.45  -0.50
Liberalization  70-74  0.88  0.87  0.85  0.75
Liberalization  75-79  0.87  0.87  0.85  0.73
Liberalization  80-84  0.83  0.83  0.86  0.73
Liberalization  85-90  0.79  0.79  0.79  0.84
(Number of observations: 71)
The  correlations  between  the  underlying  components  of the  trade  policy indicator  are
displayed  in  Table  A-III-III.  The  signs  of the  correlations  are  as  expected.  The  NTB
measure  is weakly correlated  with  the  other  indicators,  suggesting  that  its inclusion  may
provide  useful information  about  trade  policy.  However, the  NTB  coverage ratio  receives
the  smallest  weight  in the  overall index.
Table  A-III-III.  Correlations  between  the  Underlying  Components  of the
Index
Duty  Duty  DDuty  Duty  NTB  Liber.  Liber.  Liber.
1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-90  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84
Duty  70-74  1.00 l  ___lll 
Duty  75-79  0.94  1.00 |  l  l  l  l 
Duty  80-84  0.84  0.89  1.00  r  __r 
Duty  85-90  0.74  0.78  0.92  1.00 l  l  l  l  l
NTB  0.07  0.14  0.11  0.17  1.00  _  l  l  l
Liber.  70-74  -0.52  -0.52  -0.50  -0.46  -0.13  1.00 1  1  1
Liber.  75-79  -0.53  -0.53  -0.50  -0.46  -0.10  1.00  1.00
Liber.  80-84  -0.51  -0.51  -0.48  -0.44  -0.07  0.95  0.97  1.00
Liber.  85-90  -0.49  -0.52  -0.46  -0.47  -0.15  0.87  0.86 r  0.87
(Number of observations: 71)
40A-III-2. The Macroeconomic  Policy Quality Index.
The index of macroeconomic policy quality used in this paper is based on three un-
derlying components: The ratio of government deficit to GDP, the ratio of governmcnt
debt to GDP and a measure of excessive monetary creation, equal to the difference  be-
tween the growth rate of M2 and the growth rate of real GDP (this is based on the fact
that  a growing economy  needs to be supplied with liquidity; any excessive  money growth
sustained for a long time is likely to result in nothing more thlan inflation). Each country
is first ranked according to each component.  Each decile is then given a number from 1
to 10, with higher numbers signaling better policies (low excess money growth, low deficit
ratio, low debt ratio),  and these rankings are simply summed up.  The use of quantiles
avoids having to decide what  a good policy is in absolute terms, and defines the quality
of macroeconomic  policy relative to the policies adopted in the rest of the world. It also
avoids having an index that  increases systematically through time due to the accumulation
of the public debt. Lastly, it increases the spread of the index compared to an index based
on scaled values of the underlying data,  which provides more within- and cross-country
variation.
Summary statistics for the macroeconomic  policy index are contained in Tables A-Ill-
IV and A-III-V. The correlations suggest that  the excessive growth of money plays the
least part in the variation of the index of macroeconomic  policy.
Table A-III-IV.  Summary  Statistics  for the  Macroeconomic  Policy  Index  and
its  Components
Variable  JMean  IStd.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Macro Index 70-74  5.26  1.84  1.33  9.33
Macro Index 75-79  5.13  1.84  1.33  8.67
Macro  Index  80-84  5.20  1.99  1.00  9.33
Macro Index 85-89  5.47  1.86  1.00  9.00
Deficit ratio 70-74  -2.61  3.20  -19.44  3.60
Deficit ratio 75-79  -4.72  4.49  -16.53  5.29
Deficit ratio 80-84  -6.34  6.18  -43.62  2.43
Deficit ratio 85-89  -5.30  6.19  -47.02  3.64
Public Debt Ratio 70-74  25.15  18.74  0.00  118.67
Public Debt Ratio 75-79  33.51  26.33  0.00  174.86
Public Debt Ratio 80-84  52.29  50.74  0.00  332.28
Public Debt Ratio 85-89  74.08  67.87  0.00  436.85
Excess Money Growth 70-74  13.99  15.59  -0.33  143.14
Excess Money Growth 75-79  17.06  20.08  3.15  158.29
Excess Money Growth 80-84  22.37  36.75  3.49  233.15
Excess Money Growth 85-90  34.97  106.83  -7.01  853.53
Number  of Observations:  88
41Table  A-III-V.  Correlations  of the  Macroeconomic  Policy  Index  with  its
Components
1  Macro  Index  Macro Index  Macro  Index  Macro  Index
l_________________________ l1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89
Deficit ratio  70-74  0.75  0.65  0.50  0.49
Deficit ratio  75-79  0.53  0.76  0.56  0.49
Deficit ratio  80-84  0.46  0.52  0.73  0.63
Deficit ratio  85-89  0.37  0.39  0.49  0.64
Public  Debt  Ratio  70-74  -0.65  -0.62  -0.46  -0.42
Public  Debt  Ratio  75-79  -0.64  -0.72  -0.63  -0.52
Public  Debt  Ratio  80-84  -0.48  -0.55  -0.67  -0.54
Public  Debt  Ratio  85-89  -0.41  -0.47  -0.65  -0.66
Excess Money Growth  70-74  -0.33  -0.07  0.04  -0.06
Excess  Money Growth  75-79  -0.30  -0.26  -0.12  -0.23
Excess  Money Growth  80-84  -0.35  -0.34  -0.40  -0.40
Excess  Moncy Growth  85-90  -0.19  -0.22  -0.24  -0.38
Number of Observations: 88
A-III-3.  An  Alternative  Measure  of Price  Distortions.
Dollar  (1992) proposed  a measure  of outward  orientation  (or more generally, of distor-
tions)  based on an internationally  comparable  consumer  price index compiled by Summers
and  Heston  (1994). This  index is constructed  by pricing the  same  basket  of goods across
countries,  taking  the  US price basket  as a numeraire.  In the absence of nontradable  goods,
trade-induced  price distortions  and domestic  price distortions  brought  forth  by taxes,  sub-
sidies,  and  imperfectly  competitive  pricing  (the extent  of which  can  be expected  to vary
systematically  from country  to  country),  full purchasing  power  parity  ought  to hold,  and
the value of the index should be equal  across countries.  Hence, if one could somehow elim-
inate  price  level differences due  to  the  existence  of non-tradable  goods,  one  could obtain
an index  of price  distortions.
Systematic  price  level differences  due  to  the  existence  of non-tradable  are  related  to
differences  in factor  endowments.  Hence,  the  residual  from a regression  of the  price  level
on  country  factor  endowments  should  yield  a  measure  of distortions.  However, it  is not
clear that  distortions  themselves  are  unrelated  to  endowments,  so that  the  residual  may
be  leaving  out  important  variation  in  price  distortions.  Furthermore,  measures  of fac-
tor  endowments  are missing  for many  countries,  especially  as far as the  capital  stock  is
concerned.
Estimates  of price  distortions  obtained  using this  methodology  did not give very con-
vincing  results.27 OECD  countries  displayed  abnormally  high  distortions  levels, similar
to  those  of Africa.  Both  Latin  America  and  South East  Asia displayed  relatively  low dis-
tortions.  This  does not accord  with  our  priors  concerning  the  efficiency of price systems
across  countries.  Further  research  into  a  measure  of distortions  based  on  overall  price
levels seems warranted.
27Results arc available from the author upon request.
42Appendix IV. Trade Policy Matters for Growth
This  appendix  investigates  which  component  of the  trade  shares,  policy  or gravity,
affects  growth  mostly.  The  objective  is  also  to  examine  the  issue  of reverse  causality
between  trade  shares  and  growth.  Unlike in the text,  the  channel relationships  are absent
from  this  Appendix.  The  system,  made  up  of two  sets  of equations  (the  four  growth
equations  for  periods  1970-74, 1975-79,  1980-84 and  1985-1989, and  the  four  openness
equations  for  the  same  periods),  is estimated  jointly  using  three-stage  least  squares.2 8
The  estimator  used  is the  same  as the  one  discussed  in the  text.  Note  that  the  measure
of openness  now  consists  of the  ratio  of imports  plus  exports  over  GDP,  which  appears
directly  in the  growth  equation.
A-IV-1.  Reverse  Causation
We first  consider  the  effects of a  higher  trade  to  GDP  ratio  on  the  growth  rate,  as
well  as  the  possibility  of reverse  causation  whereby  growth  might  affect  the  degree  of
openness  rather  than  the  opposite.  The  regressors  that  appear  in  the  growth  equation
are:  the  log of initial  GDP, the  level of human  capital  (measured  by  the  average number
of years  of schooling  in the  total  population  over age 25), the  black  market  premium  on
the  exchange  rate,  the investment  share  in GDP,  the  measure  of trade  openness  (imports
plus exports  over GDP)  and the share of government  consumption  in GDP. The regressors
included  in the  openness  equation  are:  the  growth  rate  of GD'P  (to assess the  magnitude
of endogeneity),  the  log of the  country's  area,  a  measure  of terms  of trade  shocks,  the
log of population,  and  the  Sachs  and  Warner  dummy  for liberalization  status  (averaged
over 5-year time periods),  and a measure  of the country's  distance  from the  capitals  of the
world's  20 major  exporters.  The results  for this  procedure  are reported  in Table  A-IV-I.
The  coefficient on the  trade  to GDP  ratio  is positive  and  significant  at  the  90% confi-
dence level.  The magnitude  of the coefficient suggests that  a 10 percentage  point  increase
in the  trade  to  GDP  ratio  leads  to a 0.17 percentage  point  increase  in the  annual  growth
rate  of the  economy.  Although  this  is admittedly  a  small  effect,  it  might  be  important
intertemporally  (if the  US  had  grown just  1 percentage  point  slower per  annum  since
1870, its  per  capita  income would  be that  of today's  Hungary  or Mexico, see Barro  and
Sala-i-Martin  (1995), p.1).
We reestimated  this  growth  relationship  without  controlling  for the endogeneity  of the
openness  variable.  Specifically, the  growth  regression  above was reestimated  in isolation
of the  openness  equation,  and  the  openness  variable  was added  to the  list of instruments
(this  is equivalent  to not  instrumenting  for openness).  The  coefficient on  the  trade  ratio
decreased  to  0.004  and  became  insignificant  at  any  reasonable  confidence  level  (t=.52).
28The instruments  used  are:  the  log of initial  income  for all periods,  population  density  for  all periods,
a dummy  for major  religions  (Muslim,  Confucian/Buddhist,  Catholic,  Other  Christians),  a dummy  for oil
exporting  countries,  the  number  of years  the  country  was involved  in  an  external  war  during  the  period
1960-1985,  a  dummy  for  whether  the  country  obtained  independence  after  the  Second  World  War,  the
log of population  for  all periods,  the  share  of population  over  65 for  all periods,  the  log of the  country's
land  area,  the  log of the  distance  measure,  and  the  measure  of terms  of trade  shocks  for all periods.  The
panel  data  used  throughout  this  Appendix  contain  61 countries  for 4 time  periods  (averages  over 1970-74,
1975-79,  1980-84,  1985-89).
43This  broadly  confirms previous  results  by Frankel  (1996), showing that  the  effect of trade
openness  on  growth increases  when controlling  for endogeneity.
Table  A-IV-I:  Openness  and  Growth
Dep.=  Growth  (%)  3SLS  Dep.=  Trade ratio  (%)  3SLS
Constant  14.041  Constant  150.545
(4.88)  (10.50)
Log of Initial  -1.865  Growth  rate  (%)  1.092
Income  (-4.89)  (5.60)
Trade  to GDP  0.017  Log of land  area  -3.628
ratio  (% GDP)  (1.91)  (-2.40)
Years of schooling  2.03  Terms of trade  20.972
(male)  (3.33)  shocks  (3.55)
Years of schooling  -1.82  Log of population  -7.464
(female)  (-2.79)  (-4.37)
Black  Market  -0.839  Sachs-Warner  7.54
Premium  (-5.08)  dummy  (averaged)  (1.82)
Investment  0.155  Log of distance  -8.282
share  (% GDP)  (4.53)  (-2.05)
Government  -0.119  R-squared  .51 .57 .56 .55
consumption  (% GDP)  (-2.77)
R-Squared  .31 .22 .22 .28
(t-statistics in parentheses)
The trade  openness equation  also displays common patterns:  country  size, as measured
by  land  area  or population,  has  a  significantly  negative  effect  on  trade  openness.  The
distance  from the  world's  main  trading  nations  also  has  a negative  impact  on  the  trade
ratio.  Positive  terms  of trade  shocks  potentially  lead  to  both  more  exports  and  more
imports,  hence a positive  impact  on the  trade  ratio.  The  Sachs and  Warner  measure  of an
open  trade  policy also has  the  expected  sign,  and  is large  in magnitude  (economies  with
open trade  policies have trade  to GDP  ratios  7.54 percentage  points  higher than  those with
policies that  discourage trade,  all other  things  equal).  Lastly, the  contemporaneous  growth
rate  has a positive  and significant effect on the trade  to GDP  ratio.  The magnitude  of this
coefficient is rather  small:  a  1 percentage  point  increase  in the  growth  rate  leads  to a  1.1
percentage  point increase  in the trade  to GDP  ratio.  But  we do find statistically  significant
evidence of reverse causation:  growth positively  affects the trade  to GDP  ratio,  even if the
effect may be considered  small (especially  compared  to the effects of, for instance,  country
size or the  trade  policy regime).
A-IV-2.  Separating  the  impact  of gravity  effects  from  policy  effects.
We now attempt  to separate  the  effects of gravity-type  variables  on  growth  (country
land  area  and  population,  terms  of trade  shocks)  from policy effects.  In order  to do this,
we first run  a regression of trade  openness,  measured  by the ratio  of imports  and  exports
to  GDP, on  land  area,  distance,  growth,  terms  of trade  shocks and  the  log of population.
The  fitted  value  from  this  regression  is a  country's  "potential  degree of openness".  The
deviation  of this  fitted  value  from  the  observed  measure  of openness  is interpreted  as
44the  effect of policy  on openness.2 9 The smaller  the  deviation,  the  more  distortionary  the
policy  (negative  deviations  signal  a policy  that  reduces the  effective trade  to  GDP  ratio
through  protection,  while positive  deviations  signal policies that  favor international  trade
integration).  Results  from this  regression  are  as follows:
Table  A-IV-II.  Gravity  Equation
[Dep=  Trade  ratio  (%) [  3SLS
Constant  157.131
(10.72)
Growth rate (%)  0.943
(4.68)
Log of land  area  -3.719
(-2.39)
Terms  of trade  shocks  23.503
(3.76)
Log of population  -7.048
(^4.12)
Log of distance  -12.031
(-3.26)
R-squared  .51 .56 .52 .55
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Following are summary  statistics  for the  "potential  openness  component"  and  for the
"policy  attitude  component":
Table  A-IV-III.  Summary  Statistics  (Openness  Decomposition)
|__________________  |Mean  I Std  dev.  Minimum  Maxiimum  |
Gravity  component  1970-74  53.23  15.87  7.81  81.34
Gravity  component  1975-79  53.42  16.35  9.25  81.45
Gravity  component  1980-84  51.28  16.34  8.93  77.98
Gravity  component  1985-89  48.44  16.30  11.15  77.45
Policy component  1970-74  -4.66  15.76  -44.51  33.53
Policy component  1975-79  1.44  16.82  -33.23  36.53
Policy component  1980-84  5.11  20.28  -35.07  65.03
Policy component  1985-89  5.93  17.89  -31.32  65.63
These two measures  are then  included  in the  growth regression instead  of the  observed
trade  to  GDP  ratio.  The results  from this  growth  regression appear  in table  A-IV-IV.30
The  estimates  suggest  that  it  is the  "trade  policy"  component  of openness  that  matters
29This is a much  less reliable  measure  of trade policy  openness  than the one used in the text. Indeed,
the residual  from the gravity equation  may contain more than policy  effects. Other potential defects  of
this deviation  approach  are discussed  in section 2.2.1 of the text. However,  by purging out the gravity
component,  we can gain some  insight into the relative  role of gravity  and other components.
30The growth  model was, once again, estimated  jointly with a trade openness  equation in which  the
observed  trade ratio was  the dependent  variable.  The results  for that equation  are essentially  the same  as
those presented  in the first part of this note.
45most  for  growth.  The  gravity  component  alone  is not  statistically  different  from  zero.
Once  geographical  and  environmental  factors  have  been  "purged"  out  of the  openness
measure,  the  effect of openness on growth increases by 60% and  becomes significant at  the
5% level.
Table  A-IV-IV.  Growth  Regression  with  Decomposed  Trade  Effects
Dep  =  Growth  rate  (%) [  3SLS
Constant  13.503
(4.56)
Log of Initial  income  -1.690
(-4.13)
"Trade  policy component"  0.027
(2.08)
"Gravity  component"  0.0036
(0.28)
Years of schooling  (male)  1.884
(3.01)
Years of schooling  (female)  -1.806
(-2.72)
Black Market  Premium  -0.834
(-5.01)
Investment  share  0.155
(4.48)
Government  consumption  -0.118
(-2.69)
R-squared  .33 .22 .22 .28
(t-statistics in parentheses)
A-IV-3.  Conclusion
1.  There  is some evidence of reverse  causation,  although  the  magnitude  of the  effect
of  growth  on  openness  is  rather  small.  A  1 percentage  point  increase  in  a  country's
growth  rate  leads  to  a  1.1  percentage  point  increase  in  its  trade  to  GDP  ratio,  other
things  equal.  Once endogeneity  is controlled  for,  the  estimated  effect of trade  openness
on growth  increases  and  becomes statistically  significant.
2.  Once trade  ratios  have  been  "purged"  of their  gravity  component,  their  effect on
growth  becomes  larger  and  even more  significant.  This  can  be considered  evidence  that
what  matters  most  for growth  is not  the  trade  to  GDP  ratio  per  se,  but  the  prevailing
trade  policy.  This  provides  justification  the  focus  on  trade  policy  openness  throughout
this  paper.
46Appendix V. Increasing Returns,  the Size of the Market and Growth:
A Replication Exercise
This  appendix  replicates  and  checks the  robustness  of the findings in a paper  by Ades
and  Glaeser  (1994, henceforth  AG), in which  the  authors  document  the  fact  that,  in two
sets  of economies  (US  States  in  the  19th  century  and  developing  countries  since  1960),
increasing  returns  operate  by  expanding  the  extent  of the  market.  Their  evidence shows
that,  in samples that  display  absolute  divergence  (which is possible only under  increasing
returns  technologies),  countries  with  larger  internal  markets  benefit  less from openness  in
terms  of growth.  Put  differently, more open countries  tend  to display  a smaller correlation
of growth with initial  income than  closed countries, with openness  measured  as the ratio of
exports  plus imports  to  GDP. This  is the  case because  openness eliminates  the constraint
imposed  on growth  by the size of the  internal  market.  Under  increasing returns-size  of the
market  theories,  what  matters  for growth  is how much effective demand  can be directed
towards  the  productive  sector.  Greater  effective  demand  originates  either  from  a  larger
internal  market  of .from foreign  markets,  but  only  open  countries  can  benefit  from  the
latter.
A-V-I.  Divergence  and  the  Extent  of the  Market.
The basic test  of divergence involves regressing the growth rate  (averaged between  1960
and  1985) on  initial  income in  1960 measured  in PPP  adjusted  dollars.  To evaluate  the
role of openness  and market  size, two other  regressors  are added:  openness  (trade  to GDP
ratio,  averaged  over 1960-1985) and  an  interaction  term  between  openness  and  the initial
level of GDP.3"  To examine  robustness,  other  variables  such as regional  dummies  and  an
education  variable  are  added.  Table  A-V-Il  below replicates  table  3 in  AG  (appendix).
The  only  difference compared  to  their  set up  is that  the  openness  variable  here  is taken
from  the  latest  version  of the  Summers-Heston  data  set,  whereas  AG  used  World  Bank
data.  Income  and  growth  are  from  version  4.0  of Summers-Heston,  as  in  AG.  Results
based  on  the  latest  version  of the  Penn  World tables  (version  5.6) display  no  significant
differences  compared  to  the ones presented  in table  A-V-IL.
In addition  to  the  developing  countries  sample chosen by  AG, in which  they  selected
countries  with per  capita  income lower than  $1,500 (in 1980 constant  dollars),  we run  the
same  regressions  for an extended  sample,  which  includes the  OECD  as well as a  broader
range  of developing  economies.  AG only  sought  to examine  how increasing  returns  oper-
ated,  so they  selected a sample of countries  in which  they  knew unconditional  divergence
did hold.  However, in order  to  analyze  the  effect of market  size on  growth  in a broader
framework,  and  to  check the  robustness  of the  AG results,  we extended  the  sample.  An
increased  market  size should not be a channel whereby  openness spurs  growth in a sample
where increasing  returns  does not  operate.
3'Note  that there is no control  for the endogencity  of the openness  measure.  When replication  the esti-
mations  using an instrumental  variables  estimator, neither  the sign nor the magnitude  of the coefficients
were affected. The precision  of the estimates, however,  decreased  significantly.  This is a natural conse-
quence  of  using  IV. See  appendix  IV for  a more  thorough  investigation  of this aspect  of the growth-openness
relationship.
47Table  A-V-I.  Summary  Statistics  for  the  Main  Variables
_________________________I  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Mean  Std.  Dev.]
Summers  Heston  v.4.0
Initial  GDP  1960 (thsds  of US$)  0.739  0.366  1.79  1.753
Growth  1960-1980 (annual)  0.0187  0.018  0.020  0.019
Number  of countries  64*  64*  113  113
Summers  Heston  v.5.6
Openness  1960-85 (share)  0.563  0.282  0.615  0.391
Initial  GDP  1960 (thsds of US$)  0.747  0.364  1.800  1.755
Growth  1960-1980 (annual)  0.0187  0.018  0.020  0.018
Number  of countries  63*  63*  112  112
(* All part of the AG 65 country sample)
Table  A-V-II.  OLS  Estimates  of the  AG  regressions
I AG  dev.  countries  sample  Full  sample  l [  IIL______  _ __IF  -(I)  1  (2)  _  _  _(_3)  _(4)  l  (5)  _  _(6)_
Constant  0.00704  -0.014  -0.0096  0.022  0.0015  0.0021
(1.39)  (-1.29)  (-1.02)  (10.63)  (0.34)  (0.43)
Initial  income  0.015  0.033  0.016  -0.001  0.0038  -0.0021
(2.47)  (2.63)  (1.40)  (-2.63)  (2.03)  (-1.37)
Openness  0.041  0.045  0.028  0.0201
(2.28)  (2.80)  (4.13)  (3.83)
Openness*initial  _  -0.035  -0.038  -0.0044  -0.0034
income  (-1.813)  (-2.42)  (-1.64)  (-1.69)
Primary  school  0.031  0.033
enrollment  (4.12)  (5.57)
Latin  America  -0.016  -0.019
(-3.06)  (-5.50)
Sub-Saharan  - -0.015  - -0.017
Africa  (-2.63)  (-4.59)
R-Squared  .088  .165  .505  .049  .186  .57
Obs.  65  64  63  115  113  111
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Data  is from Penn World Tables v.4.0, except openness measure, from Penn World Tables v.5.6
The results  of the replication  exercise are satisfactory.  Both  in terms  of orders  of mag-
nitude  and  in terms  of the  signs of the  coefficients, regressions  (1)-(3) closely track  those
reported  in AG. In regression  (1), initial  income bears a positive and  significant coefficient,
suggesting  absolute  divergence in our sample.  In regression (2), the  inclusion  of openness
and  the interaction  term  also confirms the  results  in AG: in more open countries,  the size
of the  internal  market,  proxied  by  per  capita  income,  has  a  lower  effect  on  subsequent
growth.3 2 Put  differently,  the  effect  of openness  on  growth  is lower  for countries  with  a
larger  internal  market.  This  strongly  suggests  that  one channel  through  which  openness
32The relevance of this  approximation is debatable.  After all, total GDP is arguably a better proxy for
48may  matter  for growth is the market  size channel.  The rcsults  do not seem sensitive to the
inclusion  of regional  dummies  and  the  primary  school enrollment  rate.  In all regressions,
openness  in isolation  of the interaction  term  has a strong  positive  impact  on growth (a 10
percentage  point  increase in the trade  to GDP  ratio rises the growth rate  by 0.4 percentage
points  per  year,  which is in line with  the  results  in note  #3).
Much  of this  breaks down when  we consider a larger  sample of countries.  The uncon-
ditional  regression  (4) displays evidence of very weak absolute  convergence  (the coefficient
is very  small:  a  1000 dollar  difference  in  per  capita  initial  income  (1980 base)  entails  a
0.1  percentage  point  difference  in  growth  rates  across  countries).3 3 Although  openness
retains  its  strong  positive  influence  on  growth,  the  interaction  term  is now insignificant
and  ten  times  smaller than  for the  restricted  sample.  In a sample  that  includes  countries
that  do not  seem to display  increasing  returns,  there  are no substantial  gains to having  a
larger  market  in terms of growth.  This,  admittedly,  may not be considered  very useful:  we
know that,  in theory,  size cannot  matter  unless there  are increasing returns.  However, this
result  suggests  that,  although  the  extent  of the  market  channel  may  operate  for  certain
countries  (mainly the  poorest  ones),  it is certainly  not the only channel whereby  openness
spurs  growth.  Indeed,  with  this  extended  sample,  openness still  has  a positive  impact  on
growth  despite that  fact that  the  increasing  returns/size  of the market  story  breaks  down.
A-V-IL.  Growth  Decomposition
We continue the replication  of the AG results  by considering  a decomposition  of growth
rates  according  to  a  factorial  analysis  akin  to  growth  accounting.  Specifically, we start
with  a simple production  function  in which  output  per  capita  is a function  of technology,
of per  capita  physical  capital  stock  and  of per  capita  human  capital:
Yit=  F(A,Kit,Hit)  =  AeOitK:Hi  (1)
or:
logYit = logA  +  -IlogKit  + alogHit  + Oit  (2)
where  A grows at  a constant  rate  Oi and  the  coefficients a  and  3 are assumed  to be time
and  country  invariant.
Taking  first  differences of (2) yields:
o  Yit  Klog +alog  Ht  (3)
g Yit-=  Kit-l  Ht-l
This is just  a growth regression in which the right  hand side variables  represent  the  change
in factor  inputs  for a given country  over time,  and the residual  qi captures  the contribution
the  size of the  market  than  per  capita  GDP.  Countries  with  a  relatively  high  per  capita  GDP  may  still
display  a small internal  market  if they  are sparsely  populated.  In this ease, the  size of their  internal  market,
if they  are closed to trade,  is imposing  a constraint  on their  growth  rates,  as indivisibilities  prevent  certain
investrnents  from  being  profitable  unless  the  market  for the  corresponding  products  becomes  larger.  See
Alesina,  Spolaore  and  Wacziarg  (1997) for  a discussion  of this  issue.
33The fact  that  increasing  returns  seem to hold  for poorest  countries  (as in the  AG sample)  but  no longer
when  richer economies  are brought  into  the picture  may  suggest  interesting  paths  for future  research:  Why
is it that  initial  income  has a positive  impact  on growth  for poorer  countries  but  not  for richer ones  ? The
study  of the  endogenous  change  in market  structure  is largely  absent  from economics.
49of technological  progress to growth  (akin to Total  Factor  Productivity).  For each country,
we can use (3) to determine  the respective  contributions  of physical  capital  accumulation,
human  capital  accumulation,  and  technological  change,  to  the  overall  observed  growth
rate.
To estimate  the parameters  of (3), we can either  estimate  (2) using a country-specific
fixed effects estimator,  and  then  proceed  with  the  appropriate  algebraic  manipulation  to
obtain  (3), or we can directly  estimate  equation  (3) for two dates  (1960 and  1985), as in
table  A-V-III  below.34 The two solutions  should  yield algebraically  the  samc  estimates.
Table  A-V-ILI.  Estimates  of  the  Parameters  in Equation  (3)35
|  OLS|
a  (human  capital)  -0.045
(-1.00)
,i  ( physical  capital)  0.614
(10.27)
Number  of Obs.  43
R-squared  .55
(t-statistics in parentheses)
We then  construct  a measure  of the extent  of the market  based  on  a weighted  average
of initial  GDP,  openness  and  the interaction  between  the  two.  As in AG, the  weights are
obtained  by  running  the  basic  growth  regression  (Table A-V-IH) and  using  the  respective
estimates  as  the  weights  in  the  construction  of the  extent  variable.  The  growth  in  per
capita  human  capital,  the  growth  in per  capita  capital  stock and  the  estimated  residual
from equation  (3) are then  regressed  on  a constant  and  the  extent  of the  market  variable
to determine  the magnitude  of each channel  (Table  A-V-IV).
Table  A-V-IV  - Extent  of the  Market  and  the  Sources  of Growth
Dep.  var.:  Growth  of per  cap.  1  Growth  of human  1  Residual  from  1
|____________  |capital  (1960-85)  |  capital  (1960-85)  |  equation  (3)
Constant  0.177  0.521  0.132
(0.45)  (0.91)  (0.28)
Extent  of the  1.208  0.970  1.783
Market  (1.67)  (0.86)  (2.06)
Number  of Obs.  42  42  42
R-squared  .06  0.018  .10
(t-statistics in parentheses)
The  total  effect  of the  extent  of the  market  on growth,  through  each of the  channels,
is given in Table  A-V-V:
34AG prefer  a third  method.  They  stack  the  initial  income  data  for  1960 and  1985, and run  a regression
of this  stacked  initia.l income  vector  on time  specific  dummies  (one for  1960 and  one for  1985),  the  log of
human  capital  in 1960 and the  log of capital  stock  per capita  in 1960. It  is not clear  what  connection  there
is between  this  specification  and  the  relationship  derived  from  theory  a.s above.  Additionally,  I ha.ve not
been  able to  reproduce  their  results  using  their  specification.
35Data  for  the  capital  stock  are  from  Dhareshwar  and  Nehru  (1994),  population  data  and  the  human
capital  measure  (percentage  of the  population  having  completed  secondary  schooling)  are  from  Barro-Lee.
50Table  A-V-V-  Channel  Effects  of the  Extent  of the  Market
Channel  [  Estimated  effectl
Via Human  Capital  _  -0.044
Via Physical  Capital  0.742
Via the  unexplained  residual  (productivity  gains)  1.783
Total  Effect  2.481
The  results  broadly  confirm the  AG findings  (their  tablc  8b):  36  The  most  important
channel  appears  to  be the  unexplained  increase  in productivity,  which  accounts  for  two
thirds  of the  effect of the  extent  of the  market  on growth.  Physical  capital  accumulation
accounts  for the  remaining  third,  while the  growth  in human  capital  accounts  for  virtu-
ally nothing  (mainly  because  it does not  affect  the  growth  performance  in this  sample).
The  effect of a larger  market  on  growth  is thus  twofold:  Firstly,  the  level of investment
in physical  capital  is raised  by  a larger  market.  This  is in line with  theories  that  stress
the importance  of demand  spillovers and  backward  linkages  (Rosenstein-Rodan,  Murphy-
Shleifer-Vishny).  Secondly,  market  size works  by  increasing  the  speed  of technological
progress,  embodied  in the residual  from regression  (3).  Several hypotheses  can be formu-
lated to explain  this.  By allowing a greater  degree of division of labor, a larger market  size
may allow a shift towards  the production  of goods that  embody more technology  (this goes
hand  in hand  with  an expansion  of the  variety  of goods).  Secondly, the  technology  effect
may  simply  be capturing  the  fact that  more  open  economies  tend  to  be more  exposed  to
foreign technology.  An accelerated  transmission  of technology  may  well be  an important
channel  whereby  openness  spurs  growth.  These  results  tend  to  lend support  to  this  type
of explanation.
A-V-III.  Conclusion.
This  appendix  has  explored  the  relationship  between  the  extent  of the  market  and
growth,  using  the  methodology  in  Ades  and  Glaeser  (1994).  In  a sample  of the  poorest
developing countries,  which exhibits  increasing  returns  to scale  (unconditional  divergence),
openness  and  initial  income have  a  positive  impact  on growth.  The interaction  between
the  two has  a negative  effect on  accumulation.  The effect of these  'extent  of the  market'
variables  works  mainly  through  growth  enhancing  technological  improvements  and  the
accumulation  of physical capital.  Possible interpretations  of these results  are the following:
(1).  The  size of the  internal  market  is an  important  constraint  on  growth.  By  inte-
grating  in the  world economy, many  poor  and  small  countries  are  likely to  be better  able
to exploit  dynamic  increasing  returns  and  grow faster.  However, this  channel  is by far not
the  only channel  whereby openness  improves  growth.
(2).  Access to  larger  markets  works  in  two ways:  it  makes  previously  unprofitable
investments  worth  undertaking,  thus  solving a coordination  problem  within  the  economy.
Furthermore,  it  allows technological  improvements  to  take  place,  either  through  direct
technological  transmissions,  or through  a  shift  in  the  product  mix  towards  goods  that
embody  more sophisticated  technology.
36 The  magnitudes  of the  estimates  are not  directly  comparable  due  to differences  in units  between  the
data  in AG and the  data  used herein.  However, the  estimated  contributions  of the factors  can be compared.
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